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Abstract 
In this study we examine whether theoretically inconsistent foreign bond allocations are 
associated with economic fundamentals and/or non-economic behavioural factors. Using panel 
data for 54 developed and emerging markets spanning a temporal period of 12 years, the results 
show that non-economic factors, i.e. familiarity with foreign markets and behavioural 
characteristics of source markets, are the stronger drivers of biases in foreign bond allocations. 
Further, using the recent 2009-11 European sovereign debt crisis as an experimental set-up, we 
find that investors reduce their foreign bond allocations during the debt crisis, with the 
withdrawals being more severe from the most affected countries. We also find that the 
relevance of familiarity with foreign markets becomes more pronounced during the European 
debt crisis. However, in case of the recent 2007-09 global financial crisis, we find no evidence 
of change in foreign bias by international bond investors.  
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1. Introduction 
Although contrary to finance theory, it is well established that portfolio investors overinvest in 
their domestic markets and underinvest in foreign markets, leading to investment biases. Most 
of the existing studies explaining these biases focus on equity investments, particularly 
explaining the cross-country differences in overweighting of domestic equities, referred to as 
equity home bias (Cooper and Kaplanis 1994; Grinblatt and Keloharju 2001). The issue of 
underweighting of foreign markets, referred to as foreign bias,1 has received much less 
attention. It focuses mainly on equity investments (Chan et al 2005; Beugelsdijk and Frijns 
2010) and there is disagreement on the possible causes. For the first time to our knowledge, we 
explore the relative relevance of ecnomic and non-economic determinants of biases in foreign 
bond investments, examining their behaviour during the global financial and European debt 
crises.  
In addition to filling the research gap on foreign bias, particularly on bonds, our study 
on the international allocation of bonds is also motivated by the importance, development and 
characteristics of the bond market. The size of global bond markets is roughly twice the size of 
equity markets.2 Further, it has witnessed steady growth in the past decade, as debt has become 
an important source of finance for governments, financial institutions and corporates.3 Despite 
such significant increases in the absolute dollar value of cross-border bond investments, the 
data reveals that bond investors are still not diversifying internationally to benefit from the 
optimal risk-return trade-off.   
                                                          
1 In this paper, we follow the general terminology and denote relatively higher foreign investment in a foreign 
market as positive foreign bias and relatively lower foreign investment in a foreign market as negative foreign 
bias.  
2 See McKinsey and Company (2011) for comparative size of equity and debt markets. 
3 Data from Bank for International Settlements (BIS) show that bond market size increased from USD 35.5 trillion 
in year 2001 to USD 97.5 trillion in 2012. During the corresponding period, cross-border holdings of long-term 
debt (excluding money market instruments) grew from USD 5.5 trillion to USD 19.8 trillion, as reported by 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) in its Coordinate Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS). 
3 
 
Bonds also have unique characteristics relative to equity as asset class, and therefore 
the underlying determinants of bond foreign biases could be different from that observed in 
equity investments. For example, compared to equity markets, bonds exhibit lower volatility 
returns with a higher element of relative safety.4 Studies likewise show that government bond 
returns are not influenced by the same factors that impact equity returns (Elton 1999). 
Similarly, Campbell and Taksler (2003) report that the price of bonds can significantly diverge 
from that of equities, implying that different factors could drive the attractiveness of equities 
and bonds asymmetrically. These differential factors, along with their growing size and 
importance in the world economy, motivate us to examine whether it is the economic 
fundamentals or non-economic factors that are more influential in international bond 
investment bias.5 Further, there is evidence that investors do not flee volatility in equity markets 
but do take flight from volatility in bond markets (Burger and Warnock 2003). Therefore, we 
investigate whether there were any significant reallocations of bond investments from countries 
most affected by the recent Eurozone sovereign debt crisis. Additionally, the setting of debt 
crisis along with recent global financial crisis, allows us to test whether the sensitivity of 
economic and non-economic factors is different during periods of economic crisis relative to 
non-crisis periods.   
In summary, we examine three important issues related to foreign bond investments. 
First, we investigate whether it is the economic fundamentals and/or non-economic factors that 
are associated with biases in foreign bond allocations. Second, using the 2009-11 European 
sovereign debt and 2007-09 global financial crises as experimental set-ups, we investigate 
whether investors reallocate/rebalance their bond portfolio during these turbulent economic 
                                                          
4 Government bonds, as of 2011, occupy approximately 45% of global bond market (McKinsey and Company 
2011). 
5 We use the term ‘non-economic’ in a narrow sense to include bilateral familiarity and source country-specific 
behavioural factors unless there is a need to discuss these two categories separately. As discussed in Section 2.2, 
we capture bilateral familiarity using country-pair language, distance, and trade (Chan et al 2005). Our source 
country-specific behavioural factors are related to uncertainty avoidance and masculinity.  
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periods. Third, we examine whether the crises periods interact with economic and non-
economic factors and their effect on driving biases in foreign bond allocations. 
 Using an extensive dataset on cross-border bond allocations for 54 markets (developed 
and emerging) spanning 12 years, two important findings emerge from our study. First, though 
economic fundamentals and non-economic factors (including familiarity and behavioural 
factors) both are important drivers of foreign bias, we find that familiarity, which tends to lower 
information acquisition costs with foreign markets, is the predominant driver of foreign bias. 
Given the lower volatility of bond market, the premium attached by foreign investors for 
economic fundamentals (including institutional factors) seems to be of secondary importance 
relative to familiarity with foreign markets. Further, in addition to the bilateral familiarity 
factors, non-economic investor-specific behavioural attributes also offer interesting insights in 
the allocations decisions of cross-country bond investments. We find that investors with higher 
levels of uncertainty avoidance consistently underweight foreign bond markets. In contrast, 
investors with higher levels of masculinity, a proxy for competitiveness, have greater allocation 
of funds invested in foreign bonds.  
Second, during the 2007-09 global financial crisis we find no statistical evidence of 
lower foreign bond diversification from all foreign countries. This can be explained by the 
global systematic nature of the crisis, where foreign bond markets were not as severely affected 
globally (in comparison to other asset classes) and with respect to individual regions or 
countries. However, when we include the period spanning the European debt crisis and in 
particular, focus on the markets most severely affected, i.e. Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and 
Spain (GIIPS), we find that foreign investors divest their share of relative allocations from the 
markets suffering most from the European debt crisis. Further, we also find that the importance 
of non-economic factors in explaining foreign bias is even greater during the European debt 
crisis, even after controlling for economic factors.  
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Our study contributes to the following three strands of the literature. First, we add to the 
limited literature on international bond portfolio diversification. Our study is related to De 
Moor and Vanpee (2013) but to the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to 
simultaneously investigate the relative importance of economic fundamentals versus 
behaviourally influenced non-economic factors in explaining foreign biases in international 
bond allocations.6 Second, we also supplement the literature which associates the role of 
cultural attitude with foreign investment decisions ( Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001, Graham et 
al., 2009 amongst others). Specially, we show how investor-specific cultural factors can 
influence foreign bond allocation decisions. Finally, we also contribute to the growing 
literature linking crisis periods and investor behaviour (Malmendier and Nagel 2011). We 
consider both the period of global financial crisis (2007-09) and the European sovereign debt 
crisis (2009-11) to examine how these periods influence foreign bias in international bond 
investment. Additionally, we consider whether the sensitivities of economic and non-economic 
factors can alter during the economic crisis periods relative to non-crisis periods. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The following section contains a brief 
discussion on the theoretical framework and possible determinants of foreign bias with their 
economic explanations. The subsequent section describes the data and variables. After this we 
provide the empirical analysis, and the final section concludes the paper.  
 
2. Deadweight Costs and Investment Biases 
                                                          
6 Other important differences  in our paper is the inclusion of cultural attitudes of investors because investors are 
known to make decisions based on their personal or societal traits (see Chui and Kwok, 2008; Graham et al., 2009; 
Kaplanski et al., 2015; Kirkman et al., 2006; Kwok and Tadesse, 2006). Also they examine equity and bond bias 
over 10 years without allowing for crisis periods. We focus on normal as well as economically turbulent crisis 
periods (both global financial crisis and Eurozone debt crisis) to enhance our understanding of the impact of 
different factors during these different times and provide some interesting results. We include additional tests 
related to this by segregating the data between EMU markets and non-EMU markets.  
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Our theoretical framework is drawn from Cooper and Kaplanis (1986). The framework 
stipulates that investors, assuming that they intend to maximize their return for a given level of 
risk, hold the world market portfolio in the absence of deadweight costs, i.e. when all investors 
are not hindered by any form of barrier to invest in foreign markets. However, the presence of 
direct and indirect barriers to international investments, that generates marginal deadweight 
costs, translates into deviations from the world market portfolio. We segregate the factors 
driving bond investment biases into two categories. The first group is related to economic 
fundamentals and the second to non-economic factors. Economic fundamentals are linked to 
country-specific economic and institutional factors and non-economic issues are associated 
with information asymmetry and irrationality issues. We describe all the variables we use in 
our empirical analysis in Table I, explaining both economic  and non-economic factors. 
[Insert Table I here….] 
2.1. Economic Factors,Bond Allocation and Foreign Bias   
To capture different dimensions of economic drivers of bond allocations, we use a wide range 
of economic fundamentals. These include returns on bond investments, foreign exchange risks, 
bond market development, investor protection standards, explicit barriers of formal capital 
control, and other macroeconomic factors (Chan et al 2005; Bekaert and Wang 2009; Forbes 
2010). Following our theoretical framework, we expect attractive features of foreign markets 
to reduce deadweight costs for investors thus leading to higher foreign bias. On the contrary, 
less attractive characteristics of a host market would lead to higher deadweight cost leading to 
lower foreign bias.  
In terms of bond returns, the tendency of investors seeking higher returns by increasing 
holdings in well-performing assets has been widely examined (Chan et al 2005; Curcuru et al 
2011). Based on this argument it is expected that recent higher market returns would motivate 
investors to increase their bond holding in that market, leading to higher foreign bias.   
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Exchange rate volatility can increase deadweight costs for international investors (if 
bonds are issued in an overseas currency). Fidora et al (2007) find that investors are more likely 
to invest more in their domestic markets than investing abroad when faced with higher foreign 
exchange volatility. We anticipate that the higher exchange rate of a host market would make 
it less attractive for international bond investors, thus leading to lower foreign bias in that 
market.  
Differential levels of bond market development across the globe can also generate 
deadweight costs for investors. Forbes (2010) finds that a country’s financial market 
development positively influences foreign investment, as a well-developed market offers 
enhanced liquidity and efficiency. This suggests that a well-developed foreign market can 
attract international bond investors resulting in higher foreign bias. 
 With respect to investor protection, La Porta et al (1997) demonstrate that countries 
offering a lower level of investor protection have less developed capital markets lacking the 
optimal breadth and depth. Similarly, Bae et al (2006) find that foreigners invest more in bonds 
of those countries that safeguard investors’ property rights. As a result, within our framework, 
the higher degree of investor protection standards in a host market generates lower degree of 
deadweight costs for international bond investors, thus leading to higher foreign bias. 
Although capital controls have been progressively relaxed over the past few decades 
(McLeavy and Solnik 2014), the degree of openness still varies across countries. Higher levels 
of capital control impose limits on foreign investors on their investments in national markets 
(Ahearne et al 2004). This implies that relaxing capital account restrictions and easing existing 
barriers to capital inflows would increase foreign investments in a given market (Chan et al 
2005; Forbes 2010). Therefore we expect a higher level of capital openness to be associated 
with higher foreign bias. 
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Macroeconomic imbalances and, financial and political risks could also explain foreign 
biases as they are associated with generating higher deadweight costs to foreign investors 
(Bekaert et al 2014; Afonso et al 2015). For instance, Eurozone countries struggling to bring 
their budget deficits within agreed levels could be indicators of future shocks in their bond 
markets, making those host countries less attractive for bond investors. To control for a wide 
spectrum of such risks, not included in other variables, we add country credit ratings in our 
analysis. We expect that higher country risk should discourage foreign investors leading to 
lower foreign bias. 
2.2.  Non-economic Factors, Bond Allocation and Foreign Bias 
It is suggested that higher familiarity of an asset/market leads to more investment in that 
asset/market (Huberman 2001). However, there is no conclusive consensus as to whether the 
effect of such familiarity is rational or irrational. For example, Chan et al (2005) equate higher 
familiarity to lower information costs, measuring the varying degree of information asymmetry 
between home and foreign investors, whereas Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) associate 
familiarity bias with irrationality. Earlier studies  also lend support to the non-economic and 
non-rational aspect of  familiarity where investors are more optimistic about domestic asset 
returns as they feel less competent to evaluate foreign assets (Heath and Tversky, 1991). Given 
the disagreement in segregating the familiarity and behavioural issues, in this study we use 
several country-pair and source country investor-specific factors capturing the different sources 
of familiarity and/or irrationality under the common heading of “non-economic factors”. 
We are motivated to treat the bilateral pair country factors separately from economic 
fundamentals for two reasons. First, all the economic fundamentals are country-specific and 
the familiarity explanations are country-pair dependent. Second, all economic fundamentals 
are expected to impact investment biases directly on their own, but the bilateral links are 
expected to influence investment biases indirectly through familiarity with foreign markets. 
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The first two factors we use are the geographic proximity between source and host countries 
and a dummy variable reflecting whether investors share a common language in the country-
pair. In terms of distance, Chan et al (2005) suggest that international investors are more 
reluctant to invest in countries that are relatively further away. Higher geographical distance 
creates larger deadweight costs arising from lower familiarity, which in turn leads to lower 
foreign bias (i.e. less favourable foreign allocations). A similar argument applies to common 
language, however  the impact is in the reverse direction, as sharing a common language with 
a foreign market helps in enhancing familiarity of host market thus motivating higher 
allocations (Cuypers et al., 2015; Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001). Therefore we expect bond 
investors to favour foreign markets that share a common language. The third factor known to 
capture time-varying degree of familiarity between country pairs is bilateral trade (Lane and 
Milesi-Ferretti 2008). The flow of information through trade increases familiarity with partner 
countries and therefore would increase foreign bias.  
We complement the bilateral familiarity factors with two source country-specific 
behavioural factors. The first is related to varying level of uncertainty avoidance among 
investors from different countries, and the second factor is associated with investors’ drive for 
competitiveness and material rewards. Countries where investors have higher levels of 
uncertainty avoidance are known to have greater bank-dominated (less risky) financial markets, 
whereas countries with lower levels of uncertainty avoidance are known to be more market-
dominated (more risky) (Kwok and Tadesse 2006). Empirically, Anderson et al (2011) find 
that countries with higher levels of uncertainty aversion diversify less in foreign equities, but 
they do not find outsiders being influenced by such behavioural characteristics of host country 
investors. On a similar note, Beugelsdijk and Frijns (2010) show that more uncertainty avoiding 
countries invest lower amounts in foreign equities, which is more pronounced for emerging 
markets. In summary, existing empirical evidence suggests that investors from countries that 
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have relatively higher levels of uncertainty-aversion would be less inclined to invest in 
unfamiliar assets abroad and therefore underweight foreign bonds.  
The second investor-specific behavioural factor is associated with the general view that 
some societies tend to be more competitive, assertive and reward-seeking than others (Hofstede 
1980). Intuitively, investors from societies that place more preference to competition and 
material rewards should be more inclined to venture out of familiar territory in search of greater 
rewards. Empirical evidence also suggests that investors from such competitive and reward-
seeking societies exhibit higher levels of foreign equity diversification, possibly because they 
perceive themselves to possess better information about foreign markets (Anderson et al 2011). 
Graham et al (2009) also show that investors who feel more competent invest a larger portion 
of their wealth in foreign assets. In line with this view we suggest that the tendency of a society 
to be more competitive, aggressive, and reward-seeking can drive investors to invest more in 
(foreign) markets they are less familiar with, and this might partially explain the biases 
observed in international bond diversification.  
 
3.  Data 
In this section is we discuss our data and the construction of the variables that captures different 
aspects of economic and non-economic factors. 
3.1. Measure of Foreign Bias  
The construction of a foreign bias measure needs market level crossborder bond portfolio 
holdings and bond market size data. Crossborder bond holdings data are obtained from Co-
ordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) of International Monetary Fund. After cleaning 
the data7 and based on the availability of data on bond market size, our yearly average 
                                                          
6 The CPIS database has been used by Bekaert and Wang (2009) and Lau et al (2010) amongst others. However, 
a few caveats need to be noted in using the CPIS data set. For example, investment from some countries, (notably 
China) are not reported; some investments are shown as negative values; a small sample is reported as unallocated; 
some data is reported as confidential and investments from ‘international organizations’ are also reported. For the 
11 
 
crossborder holdings figure over the sample period is approximately US$10 trillion. Our 
sample includes 54 of the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) designated developed, 
emerging and frontier markets for the period of 2001-2012.8 In terms of temporal range in our 
sample, the cross-border bond holdings increased from US$3.7 trillion in 2001 to US$14.3 
trillion in 2012. Further, the total cross-border investments received by our sample countries 
comprises of 76%  of the average total holdings (US$120 trillion for 2001-12 from a total of 
US$158 trillion) reported by CPIS. Therefore we suggest that our sample is representative of 
the aggregate global bond market portfolio investments. 
Following Fidora et al (2007), bond market size is taken from Table 14B, 16A and 18 
from Debt Securities Statistics provided by BIS. Table 14B relates to all outstanding 
international bonds and notes, excluding money market instruments, issued by domestic 
issuers. Table 16A provides figures on outstanding domestic debt securities issued by domestic 
residents and Table 18 includes figures on total debt securities (domestic and international) 
issued by domestic residents. In case of difference in amount between table 18 and combined 
14B plus 16A, we take the higher of the two. The average yearly global outstanding bond 
market figure for the sample countries is US$63.8 trillion, with a temporal variation  of 
US$35.5 trillion in 2001 to US$97.5 trillion in 2012. 
To construct the foreign bias measures, we need to first compute the bilateral allocation 
made by investors from source country i into bond portfolio issued by host country j for the 
period t as shown in the equation (1) below: 
                                                          
purpose of foreign bias, we ignore the negative and unallocated cross-border investments. Following  Cooper et 
al (2012) we replace all zero international investment as USD 1 to ensure that complete underinvestment in host 
markets are not ignored.  
8 The coverage of our sample period is dictated by the availability of data. For example, data on bond market 
development and capital openness is not yet available for the year 2013. 
 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑡 =  𝐵𝐻𝑖𝑗𝑡 ∑ 𝐵𝐻𝑖𝑗𝑡
54
𝑗=1
⁄  (1)  
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where 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the share of host country (𝑗 ) in bond holdings for investors of source country (𝑖) 
and 𝐵𝐻𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the market value of bond holdings of country 𝑗 in the portfolio of country  𝑖’s 
investors as reported by CPIS for period t. Next, the benchmark weight  of country 𝑗 in the 
world market portfolio is calculated in equation (2) as follows: 
where 𝑤𝑗𝑡
∗  is the share of country 𝑗 in world bond market and 𝑀𝑉𝑗𝑡 is the bond market 
outstanding of country 𝑗 for the period t as obtained from BIS. We follow Chan et al (2005) to 
calculate foreign bias measure for each country pair. Foreign bias (𝐹𝐵𝐼𝐴𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡 ), as defined in 
equation (3) below, is the extent to which investors from source country (i) overweight or 
underweight foreign markets (𝑗) in their bond holdings and is computed as the log ratio of 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑡 
to 𝑤𝑗𝑡
∗ . In our empirical tests higher foreign bias indicates more weight of the host market. 
3.2. Economic Variables 
We use real annual yield (YLD), net of sovereign default risk premium and expected inflation, 
as a measure of bond returns. The annual yield on ten-year government bond is computed as 
the preceding twelve months’ average yield. The data is obtained primarily from International 
Financial Statistics (IFS) of IMF. For some countries where this data is not available in IFS, 
we collect this data from Economic Intelligence Unit. Inflation figures (http://www.eiu.com/), 
based on CPI index, are from World Development Indicators (WDI) of the World Bank and 
sovereign default risk spreads based on Moody’s ratings are taken from Damodaran’s website. 
For five countries where local currency yields are not available from either source, we use 
yields from USD-denominated debt taken from JP Morgan’s EMBI series net of country risk 
 𝑤𝑗𝑡
∗ =  𝑀𝑉𝑗𝑡 ∑ 𝑀𝑉𝑗𝑡
54
𝑗=1
⁄  (2)  
 𝐹𝐵𝐼𝐴𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡 = ln (
𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑤𝑗𝑡
∗⁄ ) (3)  
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and US inflation.9 To capture exchange rate volatility (EXCH), we use the 61-country trade-
weighted and inflation-adjusted broad monthly indices for real effective exchange rate from 
BIS with year 2010 as the base year. We calculate yearly volatility as percentage change in the 
indices per year based on the preceding 36 months’ data. In all our regressions, we take the 
natural log of exchange rate volatility for a given country.  
To capture the overall bond market development, we use the sum of private domestic 
bonds and private international bonds taken as a share of GDP as a proxy for bond market 
development (BDEV) and use it in its logarithmic form in our empirical analysis.10 The data is 
sourced from Global Financial Development Database developed by Cihak et al (2013).11 Our 
measure of property rights (PROP) is from Table 2c of Economic Freedom Network (EFN) 
(freetheworld.com/datasets_efw.html) compiled by Gwartney et al (2014) and ranges from 1 
to 10. Lower score implies that rights over financial and other assets are poorly defined and not 
properly protected by law whereas higher score represents clear definition and enhanced 
protection of such rights. As a measure of capital controls, we use the openness index (CAPOP) 
from the Table 4Dii of EFN. This measure ranges from 0-10, and is constructed on the basis of 
13 different types of international capital controls measures reported in the various issues of 
Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions of IMF. A higher score 
reflects higher level of capital openness. Country risk (CRISK) measure is based on Moody’s 
ratings and ranges from 0 to 1000 basis points with higher score representing higher risk. 
Following earlier studies (Eichengreen and Mody 2000; Cruces and Trebesch 2013), we do not 
use the absolute values, but regress such credit ratings against all the other economic 
                                                          
9 The five countries are Argentina, Egypt, Indonesia, Turkey and Ukraine. Excluding these five countries from 
our sample does not change the findings of this paper. 
10 Burger and Warnock (2003) and Forbes (2010) use ratio of domestic bond market capitalization to GDP as a 
measure of overall bond market development. However, ignoring the international component of bond issuances 
ignores an important element of overall development of the bond market. 
11 This data is available only for the period 2000 to 2011. However, since the temporal variation over any two-
year period is not significantly material, we use the data from 2011 for the year 2012. 
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fundamentals and use the residuals in our equations. This residual captures all the other 
country-specific time-varying factors that we have not included in our set of economic 
variables but are used by credit rating agencies to assess the riskiness of the country. 
3.3. Non-Economic Variables 
Geographical proximity is measured by distance (DIST) in kilometres between capital cities of 
country pairs and is from Gleditsch (2014, www.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/) (natural logarithmic form 
in all regressions).12 Common language (COMLA) is a dummy variable with a value of one if 
a country pair shares major language with another country, taken from Wei and Subramaniyan 
(2007) (http://users.nber.org/~wei/data.html, see ‘Dataset 2). Bilateral trade (BILTR) is the 
weight in international trade assigned to a given country by its partner countries. Figures on 
bilateral trade, including both exports and imports, are taken from IMF Direction of Trade 
Statistics.  
For measures of source country-specific uncertainty avoidance, we take country level scores 
for uncertainty avoidance (UNTAV) from Hofstede (1980).13 It measures the extent to which 
individuals in the country feel uncomfortable with ambiguous and uncertain situations. This 
measure is based on a scale of 0-100 with higher score indicating higher level of tendency to 
avoid uncertain and ambiguous situations.14 To measure the degree of competitiveness and 
reward-seeking tendency prevalent in a society, we use the country score for masculinity 
(MASC), also from Hofstede (1980). Higher score on this dimension implies that the society 
has an affinity for more assertiveness, competition, achievement, and heroism (Hofstede 1980). 
Lower score of masculinity would be closer to feminine values associated with social caring 
                                                          
12 This information on distance in this database is very similar to that of Wei and Subramaniyan (2007) but covers 
a wider range of country pairs. 
13 Hofstede’s studies, although not without criticism, are considered to be the most widely cited studies in 
measurement of culture, see Kwok and Tadesse (2006) for a discussion. 
14 As additional robustness test, we also use similar data from Global Leadership and Organizational Behaviour 
Effectiveness (GLOBE) study of House et al (2004) . GLOBE provides two measures of uncertainty avoidance: 
one related to ‘values’ and the other related to ‘practice’. We take the uncertainty avoidance measure related to 
values as it is positively correlated with Hofstede’s measure. 
15 
 
and cooperation. This measure ranges from 0-100, with higher values reflecting higher level of 
competitive social tendencies. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
We begin the discussion of empirical results by exploring average figures of all the variables. 
The averages are discussed on individual country basis and by grouping the countries based on 
level of market development. We follow the summary analysis with the discussion on various 
regression results. 
4.1. Summary Statistics  
The average yearly summary statistics of key variables are shown in Table II for all the 54 
countries in our sample spanning a period of 2001 to 2012.15 Average foreign bias (FBIAS)  
towards a  host country (𝑗) from all source countries (𝑖) is higher for developed markets (-3.93) 
compared to emerging markets (-6.37). Notably, the top nine host countries with highest level 
of foreign bias are developed markets and nine out of the bottom ten are emerging markets.16 
Unsurprisingly, the differences in average figures suggest that investors seem to prefer to invest 
in developed market relative to their emerging counterparts. 
[Insert Table II here….] 
With respect to the fundamental variables, we note significant differences between the 
developed and emerging markets. The yearly average real yield (YLD) for developed markets 
is 1.75 percent and for emerging markets is 1.24 percent. It is evident that developed markets’ 
sovereign bonds are yielding higher real returns compared to their emerging markets’ 
                                                          
15 Data for some countries is partially missing. There are four countries (Bahrain, Kazakhstan, Mauritius and 
Ukraine) which will not be included in any regression as they have missing values in both economic and non-
economic categories. However, they are still reported as they are used to construct our foreign bias measure. 
16 The top nine countries with the highest foreign bias are (from high to low) Netherlands, United Kingdom, 
Germany, France, Ireland, United States, Austria, Finland, and Sweden. The bottom nine countries with the lowest 
foreign bias (from high to low) are Kuwait, Bahrain, Indonesia, Egypt, Israel, Thailand, Mauritius, Lebanon, and 
Pakistan. 
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counterparts. This supports our conjecture that foreign investors are attracted by higher real 
returns. Such differences suggest a positive relation between foreign bias and real return. As 
expected, the exchange rate volatility (EXCH) for developed markets (4.16 percent) is lower 
than that of emerging markets (7.57 percent). Average bond market development (BDEV) for 
our entire sample is 62.8 percent of GDP with developed markets (95.9 percent) showing 
considerably higher level of development than emerging markets (16 percent). Similarly, and 
as expected, developed countries have higher scores in terms of protection of property rights 
(PROP) and capital openness (CAPOP) and they also register significantly lower country risk 
(CRISK). 
In terms of our measures related to non-economic drivers, the common language 
(COMLA) average figure of 0.18 for developed markets implies that they share official 
language with more partner countries compared to the smaller figure of 0.14 for emerging 
markets.  These figures are particularly driven by the proximity of European countries. With 
regards to trade, on average, countries in our sample conduct 4.2 percent of their overall 
bilateral trade (BILTR) with individual developed markets as compared to 1.3 percent with 
individual emerging markets. This further signifies that developed markets are economically 
more integrated with world markets relative to emerging markets. With respect to the source 
country-specific behavioural factors, though developed markets exhibit lower level of 
uncertainty avoidance (UNTAV) than the emerging markets, the scores for masculinity (MASC) 
are similar. The figure of 59 (on a scale of 0-100) for UNTAV 17 indicates that investors from 
developed markets are less likely to avoid uncertain situations relative to investors from 
emerging markets, as reflected by the figure of 71. Apart from MASC, differences between 
developed and emerging markets in all the variables are significant at 99 percent confidence 
level. The similar scores for MASC for both the markets suggest that competitiveness and 
                                                          
17 We find similar observations using GLOBE study (House et al 2004) where developed markets have lower 
score for uncertainty avoidance (4.1 on a scale of 3.2 to 5.6) as compared to emerging markets (4.9). 
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reward-seeking societal attitudes are not the exclusive preserves of either developed or 
emerging markets. 
In summary, on average, countries with higher foreign bias are associated with higher 
recent return, lower exchange rate volatility, better developed markets, markets with higher 
level of property rights protection, more open capital markets, closer proximity with investor 
countries, higher share of common language and bilateral trading. In general,  our summary 
statistics are consistent with our expectations. In the following section, we present our  
regression analysis on the association between foreign bias and the different measures of 
economic and non-economic factors. 
4.2. Regression Results 
Drawing on the theoretical framework, the general regression specification for modelling 
foreign bias (𝐹𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡) in international bond allocations is shown in equation (4):  
where 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑗𝑡 is the vector of host country-specific (i.e. country j) economic fundamental 
variables, 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑗𝑡 is a vector of bilateral familiarity variables between home and host countries, 
and 𝐵𝑒ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑡 is a vector of the two behavioural variables specific to source country investors. 
Following Chan et al (2005), an additional variable, inverse of source country bias (INSB = 1 
– Domestic Bias), is included to allow for the fact that a higher investment at home, i.e. source 
country i, relative to the theory would automatically lower foreign investments of investors in 
source countries. For instance, if a country invests 90% of its total bond holdings in domestic 
bonds, this obviously means that there is that lower proportion of funds available to invest 
abroad. Domestic bias (𝐷𝐵𝑖𝑡) is defined as log ratio of domestic allocations of source investors 
to the world benchmark as shown below in equation (5): 
 𝐹𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽1𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑒ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝑆𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽6𝛼𝑗  + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡 (4)  
 𝐷𝐵𝑖𝑡 = ln (
𝑤𝑖𝑡
𝑤𝑖𝑡
∗⁄ ) (5)  
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where 𝑤𝑖𝑡 is the domestic allocations of investors in source country i which is constructed as 
ratio of domestic holdings to total bond holdings. Domestic allocations are computed in 
equation (6) as follows:  
Domestic holdings by investors in country i are computed as the difference between 
total domestic bond market outstanding values, as reported by BIS, and total bond holdings of 
country i by foreign investors, as reflected in the data from CPIS. Total  global bond holdings 
by investors in country i is the sum of total domestic and international bond holdings by 
investors in country i. The benchmark weight (𝑤𝑖𝑡
∗ )  of country 𝑖 in the world market portfolio 
is calculated in equation (7) as follows: 
where 𝑤𝑖𝑡
∗  is the share of country 𝑖 in world bond market and 𝑀𝑉𝑖𝑡 is the bond market value 
outstanding figure of country 𝑖 for the period t as obtained from BIS. Finally, 𝛼𝑡, in equation 
(4) are year dummies and 𝛼𝑗 are host country dummies. Due to time-constant nature of four of 
our variables of interest (i.e. DIST, COMLA, UNTAV, and MASC), the use of panel (country-
pair) fixed effects in a dynamic panel setting is not apporpriate. Hence, in the spirit of existing 
studies (Portes and Rey, 2005; Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2008), we include host country fixed 
effects. The mitigating factor is that panel-level variables that are constant over time (e.g. DIST, 
COMLA) will pick up some of the fixed effects for the panels (Portes and Rey, 2005). The 
regression results are reported with standard errors corrected at panel level clustering (i.e. 
country-pair level) using the White (1980) method.  
Table III reports the results from different model specifications with our expected sign 
for  the coefficients. Model I shows the estimates with only economic fundamentals and host 
country dummies in the regression. All fundamental factors enter the regression with expected 
 𝑤𝑖𝑡 =
 𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑 ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑏𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑖
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑 ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑏𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑖
 (6)  
 𝑤𝑖𝑡
∗ =  𝑀𝑉𝑖𝑡 ∑ 𝑀𝑉𝑖𝑡
54
𝑖=1
⁄  (7)  
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signs and are significant at least at the 1% level.18 The positive regression coefficient of YLD 
suggests that investors are more inclined to invest in markets experiencing recent higher real 
return providing support to investors seeking higher returns.19 EXCH with a negative 
coefficient reflects the expected inverse association between exchange rate volatility and 
foreign bias. This relation implies that international bond investors tend to avoid markets with 
higher exchange rate volatility, consistent with the findings of Fidora et al (2007). Similarly, 
from the positive sign of BDEV coefficients we can infer that investors are motivated to invest 
more in markets with higher level of bond market development.  Property rights (PROP) and 
capital openness (CAPOP) also show statistically significant relation in the expected direction. 
Any remaining country-specific macroeconomic, political and financial risks (CRISK), as 
expected, exhibit negative association with foreign bias.  
Model II presents results for foreign bias regressed against the five non-economic 
variables, i.e. three bilateral familiarity and two source country-specific behavioural variables, 
and host country dummies. All the variables bear the expected signs and are significant at the 
1% level. The negative sign of DIST suggests that investors avoid markets which are further 
away from them geographically. Similarly, the positive coefficient associated with language 
indicates that common language (COMLA) with a host country is positively associated with 
foreign bias. For bilateral trade (BILTR), the positive coefficient reflects that higher trade 
conducted by a trading partner promotes foreign bias in the trading partner markets. With 
respect to source country-specific behavioural factors, the negative coefficient suggests that 
higher level of uncertainty avoidance (UNTAV) leads to lower foreign bias in foreign countries, 
                                                          
18 Although we explain the regression coefficients in its qualitative terms only, given the cross-country set-up of 
our investigation, the quantitative effects of the results should be interpreted with due caution. 
19 As an alternative measure of bond returns, we also take JP Morgan’s EMBI global series for emerging markets 
and long-term government bond yields for developed markets from Datastream. We also adjust the bond yields 
of target countries by applying average exchange rate for the year from the perspective of investing countries. 
These alternative figures yield qualitatively similar results. 
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which is in line with behavioural theory expectation.20 On the other hand, a higher level of 
masculinity (MASC) is positively associated with more foreign bias. This positive association 
is also in line with our expectation and supports the findings of Graham et al (2009) and 
Anderson et al (2011). This provides support to the notion that more competitive, assertive and 
reward-seeking investors have the tendency to invest more in less familiar foreign assets.  
Model III considers all the economic and non-economic variables included 
simultaneously in the regression. The direction of association exhibited by all the variables 
remains essentially unchanged. Out of the eleven variables of interest, nine still exhibit 
statistical significance at the 1% level with the remaining two significant at 5% levels. We 
introduce control variables in Model IV in the form of inverse home bias of source country 
(INSB), and year fixed effects. INSB exhibits a statistically significant positive coefficient 
supporting the view that countries with lower domestic bias exhibit more foreign bias in 
international bond markets. Even after controlling for host country specific time-invariant 
variables and allowing for temporal variation in our dependent variable, the coefficients of our 
key explanatory variables remain qualitatively the same. The introduction of the control 
variables enhances the explanatory power (adjusted R-squared of 0.34) and eight out of the 
eleven key variables remain significant at 1% level with the other three significant at 
conventional levels. 
The overall results in Table III suggest that, among the economic fundamentals, high 
real yields, better developed bond markets, higher level of capital openness and better 
protection of property rights of host markets attract foreign investors, while higher exchange 
rate volatility is a deterrent for international bond investors. As regards to non-economic 
factors, geographic distance acts as a natural barrier to foreign bias while common language 
and bilateral trade are conducive to foreign bias. Additionally, uncertainty-avoiding investors 
                                                          
20 As noted earlier, we replace Hofstede’s measure with that of GLOBE. The coefficients are similar economically 
and statistically. To conserve space we do not report the results but could be requested from the authors. 
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are reluctant to diversify their bond holdings internationally and investors from more assertive 
and competitive societies (proxied by masculinity) tend to exhibit higher level of foreign bias, 
even after controlling for economic fundamentals. To account for the possible persistence of 
FBIAS across country-pairs, we use a dynamic panel model in the spirit of Arellano and Bond 
(1991) using one-year lag of FBIAS as an additional dependent variable and assuming all other 
variables to be exogenous. All time-constant variables drop out of the analysis but the 
remaining variables have their expected signs and all are significant at conventional levels 
(results available on request). 
 [Insert Table III here….] 
4.3. Horse Race between Economic and Non-Economic Factors 
We examine the relative importance between economic and non-economic factors using three 
different metrics. First, we compare the adjusted R-squared of the regressions that include 
economic and non-economic variables, followed by variance decomposition analysis, and then 
using standardized beta figures. Results in Table III show that the R-squared of non-economic 
variables is 0.28 compared to 0.08 for economic fundamentals (Model I and II).21  This provides 
a strong indication towards the higher explanatory power inherent in the non-economic 
variables, as compared to economic fundamentals, in explaining the variance in foreign bias.  
To further examine the relative importance of each of the variables, we perform 
variance decomposition analysis following Bekaert and Wang (2009). We produce fitted values 
(𝐹𝐵𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) of foreign bias from Model III (of Table III excluding country dummies) and calculate 
relative explanatory power (VARD) for each of the explanatory variables (X) using equation 
(8) below: 
                                                          
21 Exclusion of host country dummies yields an adjusted R-square of 0.21 for familiarity and 0.3 for fundamentals. 
 𝑉𝐴𝑅𝐷(𝑋)  =   𝛽(𝑋)   
cov (𝐹𝐵𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  ,   𝑋𝑖/𝑗,𝑡 )
var (𝐹𝐵𝑖,𝑗,𝑡)
 (8)  
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where 𝑉𝐴𝑅𝐷(𝑋)  is the relative explanatory power of explanatory variable X; 𝛽(𝑋) is the beta 
coefficient for variable X as obtained from our regression (Model III); cov(𝐹𝐵𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  , 𝑋𝑖/𝑗,𝑡 ) is 
the covariance between the fitted values (𝐹𝐵𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) and variable X. Finally, var (𝐹𝐼𝐵𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) reflects 
the variance of the fitted values (𝐹𝐵𝑖,𝑗,𝑡). From the above model, VARD for a given explanatory 
variable can be either negative or positive. The sign can be different from beta coefficient of 
the given variable because VARD measures unconditional variance contribution while beta 
coefficient in the regression measures partial correlation (Bekaert and Wang 2009).  
Table III shows that distance (DIST) and uncertainty avoidance (UNTAV) exhibit VARD 
measures of 55% and 28% respectively suggesting that more than three quarters of 
unconditional variance of foreign bias is explained by these two variables combined (total of 
VARD measures add up to unity by construction). Other variables, in the order of importance, 
are BDEV, EXCH, and MASC carrying VARD measures of 7.3, 2.7, and 2.3 percent 
respectively. Finally, and for further comparison, we also present the standardized regression 
coefficients22 for the independent variables in the final column of Table III. DIST and UNTAV 
still register the biggest impact on foreign bias with a change of one standard deviation in each 
of these two variables corresponding to reduced foreign bias by 37 and 26 percent respectively. 
In summary, our data provides consistent evidence towards the notion that non-economic 
factors, particularly related to DIST and UNTAV, explain more of foreign bias than economic 
fundamentals. 
 
 
4.4. Endogeneity  
                                                          
22 All independent variables are rescaled to have a standard deviation of one and we regress the dependent variable 
against the standardized variables. 
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Errunza (2001) notes that higher level of foreign investment can lead to reforms in local capital 
markets. This could arguably cause some of the explanatory variables that we have used, 
particularly bond market development (BDEV), capital openness (CAPOP) and property rights 
measures (PROP), to be endogenous in our regression models.23 Since bond yield (YLD) in our 
analysis is the average for the preceding 12 months and exchange rate volatility (EXCH) is the 
moving average over preceding 36 months, the issue of endogeneity is mitigated for these two 
variables. To address concerns of endogeneity for the remaining variables, we repeat all the 
variants of our basic regression model using one-year lag of the endogenous variables. Table 
IV shows that the coefficients observed after using one-year-lagged values of endogenous 
variables remain qualitatively similar to our earlier results in Table III. As an additional test, 
we use factor analysis to replace all fundamental economic variables with a single factor 
(FactorFund)24 and use a one-year lag of this first component factor in our regression models. 
FactorFund is still significant (results available on request) indicating that our results do not 
suffer significantly from reverse causality.  
[Insert Table IV here….] 
4.5. Financial Centres  
We consider the possibility that institutional investors incorporated in financial centres could 
be investing on behalf of investors of many different countries. For instance, it is possible that 
institutional investors can be incorporated within certain jurisdiction, for instance purely for 
tax purposes, and investors from other countries could be investing in foreign bonds through 
such institutional investors. This creates a problem in our data by obscuring the actual source 
country of such foreign bond investments. To address this issue, we discard all investments 
originating from countries considered to be financial centres and re-run our four models in 
                                                          
23 This is less of a problem for familiarity variables as all of them, apart from bilateral trade, are constant over 
time.  
24 The relevant Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure is 0.69, which justifies the use of this component. 
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Table III. Following Chan et al (2005), we consider United States, United Kingdom, 
Switzerland, Ireland, Japan, Hong Kong and Singapore as financial centres. Results presented 
in Table V show that the overall results remain essentially the same.  
[Insert Table V here….] 
4.6. Effect of the Two Crises Periods  
Empirical evidence suggests that foreign investors avoid markets during crisis periods and 
especially countries where they do not get information transparently (Gelos and Wei 2005) and 
that outside investors tend to exhibit herding behaviour during crises (Kim and Wei 2002). 
Investors often rebalance their portfolio during times of economic distress (known as ‘flight-
to-safety’ and/or ‘flight-to-liquidity’) (Beber et al 2009). Intuitively, foreign bias can be 
expected to decrease during such crises as the investment environment is extremely uncertain. 
We segregate the time periods in our sample into two distinct periods: crisis and non-crisis 
(normal). Crisis years for our purpose include five years spanning the global financial crisis 
(2007-09) and Eurozone debt crisis (2009-11) and the remaining years are treated as normal 
times. We choose 2007 as the start of the global financial crisis in line with chronology of 
global financial crisis provided by Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.25 Our choice of 2009 as 
the start of Eurozone debt crisis is motivated by the fact that the global financial crisis had 
already peaked and had started to be transformed into sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone 
countries by mid-2009 (Afonso et al 2015).   
We conduct a simple mean difference paired t-test to evaluate any marked changes in 
foreign bias during these two different time periods. The results are presented in Table VI. A 
significant reduction in foreign bias measure is apparent during the crises years when foreign 
bias measure decreased from -4.867 to -5.289 (Panel A). In a comparison of the foreign bias 
                                                          
25 See https://www.stlouisfed.org/financial-crisis/full-timeline. A number of other studies (including 
Grammatikos and Vermeulen 2012; Kalemli-Ozcan et al 2013) also take the year 2007 as the start of the global 
financial crisis.    
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figures for normal times with each crisis period, we find that foreign bias measure did not 
decrease at all during the global financial crisis (Panel B). In fact, there has been a slight 
increase in foreign bias during 2007-08, though the difference is not statistically significant. 
However, the period of Eurozone debt crisis witnessed a marked decline in foreign bias 
measure, which is significant (Panel C). A plausible explanation is that as the global financial 
crisis mainly impacted financial institutions, its impact on international bonds was subdued 
because of the relative safety of bonds (most of which are sovereign). However, the Eurozone 
debt crisis was an economically turbulent period with respect to uncertainty in bond 
investments.  
We develop this further, by comparing the foreign bias figures for the five GIIPS 
countries that were most severely affected by the Eurozone crisis. The results reported in Panel 
D, which are statistically significant, show that the foreign bias measure decreases by a greater 
extent in these countries. As a result, our preliminary analysis suggests that investors lower 
their foreign bond bias during international debt crises, especially in the most affected 
countries. However, given the global systematic and different nature of crisis, such divestment 
in bonds is not apparent during the global financial crisis. We conjecture that the prevalence of 
crisis in a host country serves to increase the marginal deadweight costs associated with 
investing in that country leading to under-weighting of the crisis countries by a greater extent.  
[Insert Table VI here….] 
To ensure robustness of these findings, we use regression analysis to re-examine the 
possible changes in foreign bias during normal times and also during the two crises. For 
Eurozone debt crisis, we create a crisis year dummy (ECrisis) (equalling 1) for the years 2009 
– 2011. Similarly for global financial crisis, we create crisis dummy GCrisis (equalling 1) for 
years 2007-08 and run a regression with the following specification in equation (9):   
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We present the results in Table VII (Model I). Confirming our earlier findings that 
foreign bias decreased significantly during the Eurozone debt crisis, ECrisis bears a negative 
sign and is statistically significant at 1% level but GCrisis shows no significant impact.  
In Model II, we add two more dummy variables to equation (9): EZone is a dummy 
variable of 1 for all Eurozone member countries (and zero otherwise) and EuZCr is a dummy 
variable of 1 for Eurozone member countries during Eurozone crisis years only. EZone has a 
positive and significant coefficient implying that Eurozone member countries, on average, have 
received higher foreign bias than other countries during normal times. However, the  EuZCr is 
insignificant implying that foreign bias did not decrease significantly in Eurozone countries as 
a whole during 2009-11; this is possibly because in our sample Eurozone is heavily weighted 
by Germany and France whose bond markets have fared relatively better during Eurozone debt 
crisis. If we exclude Germany and  France, the EuZCr coefficient, as reported in Model III, is 
significant (with negative sign) suggesting that foreign bias in most of the Eurozone members 
decreased during the 2009-11 Eurozone debt crisis.  
In Model IV, we introduce a dummy variable GIIPS (equalling 1 for GIIPS countries) 
to replace EZone. Similarly, we replace EuZCr with GIIPSCr which is a dummy for GIIPS 
countries during Eurozone crisis years only. GIIPSCr is negative as expected supporting our 
earlier finding that foreign bias further decreased in GIIPS countries during Eurozone debt 
crisis even after allowing for the general decline in foreign bias during 2009-11. GIIPS does 
not exhibit significant coefficient implying that these countries did not command any higher 
preference over non-Eurozone members even during normal times (unlike other Eurozone 
countries).  To ensure robustness of this finding and to further explore if the impact on FBIAS 
is influenced by regional effects, we segregate our data between EMU and non-EMU (i.e. rest 
 
𝐹𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽1𝐺𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 + 𝛽2𝐸𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐵𝑒ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑖
+ 𝛽6𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐻𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝛼𝑗 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡 
(9)  
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of the world) source markets; and EMU and non-EMU host markets, and re-run this test. The 
results are presented in Appendix 3 to 6. We do find evidence of Euro bias (Balli et al., 2010) 
where EMU countries tend to invest more in fellow EMU countries.26 Nevertheless, the results 
in these appendices provide consistent evidence that FBIAS decreased during the Eurozone 
crisis (but not during the global financial crisis); and this decrease was severe for the host 
countries that were most affected by the debt crisis. 
[Insert Table VII here….] 
Overall, the results in Table VII provide strong evidence that foreign bias decreased 
significantly during Eurozone debt crisis and that the magnitude of reduction was greater in 
those countries that were most severely affected by the crisis.  
We examine further whether this change in foreign bond bias during Eurozone debt 
crisis was influenced more by economic fundamentals or by non-economic factors. We extract 
the first component of the six economic fundamentals using factor analysis and name it 
FactorFund.27 Similarly we extract first component of the non-economic factors and name it 
FactorFam. To assess whether the importance of variables change during crises, we follow the 
approach in Gelos and Wei (2005). We interact each of the factor components FactorFund and 
FactorFam with Eurozone debt crisis dummy (ECrisis) to create interaction terms CrFundW 
(FactorFund * ECrisis) and CrFamW (FactorFam * ECrisis) and run the regression using 
equation (10) as shown below:  
 
                                                          
26 We thank the anonymous referee for this suggestion. 
27 CRISK enters factor analysis in absolute values rather than the residuals. 
 
𝐹𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽1𝐶𝑟𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑊𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑟𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡  + 𝛽3𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑗𝑡
+  𝛽5𝐼𝑁𝑆𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝛼𝑗 + 𝜖𝑗𝑡 
(10)  
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In Table VIII Model I, FactorFund enters the regression with positive sign that is 
significant at the 1%level. It is important to note the factor loadings28  which show that BDEV 
and PROP carry the highest positive values and EXCH and CRISK carry significant negative 
values. As such, positive value for FactorFund implies more foreign bias towards countries 
with lower CRISK, lower EXCH, higher PROP and higher BDEV which is consistent with our 
earlier findings. FactorFam is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. In the factor 
loadings for FactorFam,29 DIST and UNTAV have the two highest positive values while 
COMLA and BITRD have negative values. This suggests that the negative sign of FactorFam 
implies more foreign bias towards countries with common language, more trade, less distance, 
and from investors who have lower level of UNTAV. This is also consistent with our earlier 
findings. However, the key variable of interest in Model I is CrFamW which has the same 
negative sign as FactorFam implying that the importance of non-economic variables gained 
further importance during Eurozone crisis. No such inference can be made for economic 
fundamentals as CrFundW, despite bearing the same sign as FactorFund, is not significant.   
In Model II, we focus mainly on Eurozone member countries to assess possible changes 
in the importance of fundamentals and familiarity variables. We replace CrFundW and 
CrFamW by CrFundEu and CrFamEu respectively. CrFundEu is an interaction term involving 
FactorFund, ECrisis, and EZone and CrFamEu involves interacting FactorFam, ECrisis, and 
EZone. The variable of interest CrFamEu is negative implying enhancement of importance of 
non-economic variables during the crisis. Interestingly, the coefficient of CrFamEu (-1.06) 
remains similar to that of CrFundW in Model I. This is explained by the influence of France 
and Germany, without which the CrFamEu would be further negative.  
                                                          
28 Factor loadings (unrotated) for FactorFund are: YLD (-0.21), EXCH (-0.58), BDEV (+0.71), PROP (+0.79), 
CAPOP (+0.52), CRISK (-0.8).  
29 Factor loadings (unrotated) for FactorFam are: DIST (+0.41), COMLA (-0.30), BITRD (-0.39), UNTAV 
(+0.28), and MASC (+0.15). 
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In Model III, we focus on the GIIPS countries. Accordingly, we replace CrFundEu and 
CrFamEu by CrFund5 and CrFam5 respectively. CrFund5 is an interaction term of 
FactorFund, ECrisis, and GIIPS and CrFam5 involves interacting FactorFam, ECrisis, and 
GIIPS. CrFam5 is negative at the 1% level (similar to FactorFam) and its coefficient is 
markedly more negative to the comparable interaction terms in the first two models. This 
implies that the importance of non-economic factors get even more pronounced when it comes 
to investing in crisis-affected countries.30 
Overall, results in Table VIII suggest that though economic fundamentals and non-
economic factors are both important in bond investment during normal times, the importance 
of non-economic factors become much stronger and pronounced during debt crisis, and 
especially so when investing in crisis affected countries. A plausible explanation is that as debt 
crisis unfolds, bond investors would be more inclined to withdraw from those affected markets, 
and particularly from distant and unfamiliar markets, regardless of economic fundamentals.  
[Insert Table VIII here….] 
 
4.7. Developed Versus Emerging Markets  
So far we have conducted our analyses in a global setting without distinguishing between 
emerging and developed markets. However, our summary statistics in Section 4.1 show that 
there are considerable differences between the macroeconomic fundamentals of developed and 
emerging markets. On the behavioural front, though the average MASC is similar for both sets 
of countries, the level of UNTAV is lower for developed markets. This motivates us to conduct 
further tests to unravel any different investment patterns that could be observed among 
                                                          
30 We also interact each of the key variables separately (with crisis year dummy ) to create 11 interaction terms 
on top of the explanatory variables in our regression analysis. VIF score for some of the interaction terms shoot 
up to more than 10 resulting in some of the variables of interest showing up as statistically non-significant due to 
severe multicollinearity. Despite this, DIST and UNTAV continue to exhibit increased impact during the crisis. 
Results are available from authors on request.  
30 
 
developed and emerging countries.31 To achieve this, we re-run equation (4) separately for host 
emerging markets and host developed markets, and calculate the VARD measures and 
standardized beta for the variables of interest. The results shown in Appendix 1 show 
qualitatively similar results (to Table III) suggesting that the impact of variables of interest are 
pervasive across emerging as well as developed markets. We further extend this analysis to 
examine investments across various permutations of emerging and developed markets; 
specifically, we examine investments: i) from emerging markets only; ii) from developed 
markets only; iii) from emerging to developed markets; iv) from developed to developed 
markets; v) from emerging to emerging markets; and vi) from developed to emerging markets. 
For brevity, we show these results in Appendix 2 without VARD measures and standardized 
beta coefficients but again, the results are qualitatively similar.    
 
5. Conclusions 
In this study we investigate three important issues related to foreign bond investments. First, 
we examine whether economic fundamentals and/or non-economic factors are associated with 
cross-country biases, including how investor-specific behavioural features are related to 
foreign allocation in bonds. Second, using the 2007-09 global financial and 2009-11 European 
sovereign debt crisis as an experiment, we also investigate whether investors 
reallocate/rebalance their portfolio during these turbulent economic periods. Finally, we also 
examine whether the crisis periods interact with factors driving biases in international bond 
allocations.  
Using country level data from 54 countries over 12 years, we find that economic 
fundamentals and non-economic factors including familiarity and behavioural factors are both 
important drivers of foreign bias, but bond foreign bias is influenced more by non-economic 
                                                          
31 We thank the anonymous referee for this suggestion. 
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factors than economic fundamentals. We find geographical distance between countries and the 
uncertainty avoidance attitudes of investors to be more influential drivers of foreign bias 
compared to economic fundamentals. These results are robust using various tests including 
addressing endogeneity and exclusion of the main financial centres.  
We find that the deadweight costs of investing in bonds of countries experiencing debt 
crisis increase, which in turn lower foreign bias (i.e. lower allocation with respect to 
benchmark) in such affected countries. Our analysis of Eurozone debt crisis further indicates 
that such under-weighting of crisis countries is predominantly driven by the non-economic 
factors during turbulent economic periods. However, when faced with financial/banking crisis 
(i.e. global financial crisis), we do not find evidence of change in the patterns of foreign bond 
bias. The findings of the study suggest that government policies aimed at increasing 
information on domestic markets to foreign investors should attract higher foreign investments, 
as implied by the impact of familiarity and behavioural factors, particularly during volatile 
economic periods. 
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Table I: Key Variables and Definitions 
Variable 
name 
Measure  Definition 
FBIAS Foreign Bias log (ratio of weight of allocation made by foreigners to host country's 
market weight in world bond market) 
YLD Real yield on bonds annual yield on 10-year government bonds minus inflation minus 
sovereign risk; annual yield sourced from International Financial 
Statistics (%) and Economic Intelligence Unit; consumer price 
inflation is from WDI; sovereign risk measure based on Moody’s 
ratings is from Damodaran Online. Alternative figures on long-term 
bond yields are taken from JP Morgan EMBI Global series (for 
developing markets) and 10-year sovereign bonds from Datastream 
(for developed markets). 
EXCH Exchange rate volatility yearly volatility in indices for effective exchange rate; volatility for 
preceding 36 months from year-end is taken ; raw data is from BIS. 
BDEV Bond market development log ratio of private debt (both domestic and international) to GDP; data 
sourced from Global Financial Development Database available at: 
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/global-financial-development.  
PROP Protection of property rights sourced from table 2c of Economic Freedom of the World 2013 
dataset; is within the scale of 1 to 10 and higher measure indicates 
clearer definition and higher protection of property rights. 
CAPOP Capital openness (capital control) taken from table 4Dii of Economic Freedom Dataset 2013; within a 
scale of 0 to 10; higher measure indicates lower level of restrictions on 
investment and foreign ownership in that country. 
CRISK Country risk Moody’s country ratings; higher score indicates higher risk. 
UNTAV Uncertainty avoidance; reflects the 
extent to which members of a 
society feel uncomfortable with 
uncertainty and ambiguity. 
Hofstede’s measure of uncertainty avoidance (Hofstede 1980); 
alternative measure is from GLOBE study’s (House et al 2004). 
MASC Masculinity; represents a preference 
in society for achievement, 
heroism, assertiveness and material 
rewards for success. 
 Hofstede’s measure of masculinity (Hofstede 1980). 
DIST Log of distance in Kilometres 
between capital cities 
http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/statelist.html. 
COMLA Common language dummy variable of 1 if a country pair share a language; data from Wei 
and Subramanian (2007) sourced from 
http://users.nber.org/~wei/data.html which is derived from CIA 
Factbook. 
BILTR Bilateral trade weight assigned by 
partner countries 
from IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS), it is the portion of 
total trade (imports and exports) conducted, from the perspective of 
source country, with a host country. 
INSB Control for foreign bond allocation 
of home country's investors 
(1- domestic bias) of home country (country i). 
ECrisis Dummy for Eurozone debt crisis equal to 1 for years 2009-2011; otherwise 0. 
GIIPS Dummy for countries most severely 
affected by Eurozone debt crisis 
equal to 1 for Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain; otherwise 0. 
GCrisis Dummy for global financial crisis equal to 1 for years 2007-2008; otherwise 0. 
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Table II 
Summary Statistics of Key Variables 
FBIAS is a measure of bond foreign bias at country level. Foreign bias reflects deviation of country j’s share in bond holdings for each source country i (i ≠ j) (w i j) from the world bond market 
capitalization weight of country j (w* j). We calculate foreign bias by log (w i j / w* j). This table presents overall average of foreign bias measure taking yearly average of source countries’ bias in 
country j for each given year. Remaining variables include i) Economic Fundamentals for host country j and ii) bilateral and investor-specific Familiarity Factors. Economic Fundamentals include 
annual yield on long-term government bonds (YLD), exchange rate volatility (EXCH), bond market development (BDEV), protection of property rights (PROP), capital openness (CAPOP), and 
country risk (CRISK). Familiarity Factors include distance (in kilometers) between countries (DIST), common language (COMLA) dummy, average bilateral trade weight assigned by partner 
countries (BILTR), uncertainty avoidance (UNTAV) of source country, and masculinity (MASC) of source country. All variables are sourced as reported in Table 1. Data is for years 2001 to 2012. 
Panel A: All Countries 
Country FBIAS YLD (%) EXCH (%) BDEV   
(% GDP) 
PROP  
(0-10) 
CAPOP    
(0-10) 
CRISK  
(0-10) 
 DIST 
(km)  
COMLA 
(average) 
BILTR 
(%) 
UNTAV 
(1-100) 
MASC   
(1-100) 
Argentina -5.53 14.60 10.52 8.4 2.98 1.98 6.55   11,379 0.11 1.03 86 56 
Australia -3.82 2.48 8.19 95.1 8.18 2.57 0.05      13,277  0.37 2.19 51 61 
Austria -2.80 1.77 1.94 97.2 8.42 4.16 0.00 4,365  0.03 1.56 70 79 
Bahrain -7.27 n/a n/a 21.8 7.33 6.79 1.30 5,670  0.06 0.11 n/a n/a 
Belgium -3.91 1.41 2.37 104.2 7.60 5.86 0.48 4,352  0.17 3.46 94 54 
Brazil -5.02 4.46 12.48 21.8 5.40 3.78 3.17 10,075  0.03 2.37 76 49 
Bulgaria -5.44 -0.04 3.35 1.9 3.70 6.10 2.76 3,998  0.00 0.50 85 40 
Canada -4.41 2.30 5.93 54.4 8.23 7.39 0.05 8,176  0.41 1.75 48 52 
Chile -5.76 2.67 7.59 21.4 6.49 5.58 0.83 11,778  0.10 0.77 86 28 
Colombia -7.15 3.40 9.05 1.8 4.86 1.13 1.82 9,598  0.10 0.28 80 64 
Czech Republic -5.33 0.57 6.16 15.6 n/a n/a 0.90 3,816  0.00 1.21 74 57 
Denmark -4.45 1.66 2.43 188.7 8.53 7.92 0.00 4,425  0.33 1.24 23 16 
Egypt -7.60 0.26 n/a 1.2 5.00 5.16 2.76 5,053  0.41 0.54 80 45 
Estonia -7.45 3.52 2.63 2.2 7.18 6.60 0.96 4,059  0.00 0.38 60 30 
Finland -3.43 1.97 2.88 45.7 8.87 4.94 0.00 4,603  0.03 1.24 59 26 
France -2.55 2.11 2.51 102.0 8.06 6.44 0.02 4,893  0.10 6.53 86 43 
Germany -2.08 1.92 3.23 107.2 8.62 5.27 0.00 4,854  0.07 13.66 65 66 
Greece -4.14 2.65 4.34 48.1 5.86 4.89 2.54 4,616  0.00 0.62 100 57 
Hong Kong -6.24 0.86 4.48 39.5 8.21 7.87 0.59 8,458  0.36 2.06 29 57 
Hungary -4.58 1.40 7.49 11.5 5.79 5.05 1.44 3,962  0.00 1.14 82 88 
India -6.45 -3.86 5.63 3.3 6.12 0.00 2.64 6,686  0.36 3.13 40 56 
Indonesia -7.53 0.87 10.17 4.7 4.50 1.41 4.18 9,623  0.00 1.54 48 46 
Ireland -2.66 3.09 3.73 258.3 8.34 8.36 0.81 4,921  0.33 0.92 35 68 
Israel -8.68 -0.40 5.40 6.5 6.89 7.83 0.93 5,196  0.30 0.50 81 47 
Italy -3.81 1.70 2.55 72.7 5.81 7.63 0.73 4,767  0.00 6.07 75 70 
Japan -7.35 0.67 7.84 47.7 7.70 5.51 0.80 9,285  0.00 6.59 92 95 
Kazakhstan -5.15 -2.74 n/a 9.9 4.97 1.83 1.54 6,519  0.00 0.37 n/a n/a 
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Kuwait -8.13 n/a n/a n/a 6.95 4.51 0.59 5,298  0.31 0.53 80 40 
Lebanon -11.26 n/a n/a 2.1 5.38 1.54 5.52 5,191  n/a 0.13 50 65 
Lithuania -3.58 3.42 3.25 n/a 5.51 3.08 1.52 3,732  0.00 0.50 65 19 
Malaysia -6.07 0.16 3.43 67.4 7.02 0.71 1.13 8,777  0.00 2.49 36 50 
Mauritius -9.73 1.73 n/a n/a 6.54 6.12 1.39 8,967  0.34 0.05 n/a n/a 
Mexico -4.52 2.30 7.94 19.7 5.03 1.60 1.38 10,123  0.11 1.51 82 69 
Netherlands -1.89 1.76 3.12 196.7 8.45 9.15 0.00 4,894  0.03 5.08 53 14 
New Zealand -5.40 2.60 7.87 7.9 8.06 7.62 0.06 15,002  0.35 0.30 49 58 
Norway -3.74 2.00 5.31 29.8 8.18 5.37 0.00 4,654  0.00 1.11 50 8 
Pakistan -11.20 -6.73 n/a 0.4 4.03 0.77 5.98 6,523  0.34 0.32 70 50 
Philippines -6.42 0.91 5.28 8.5 4.46 0.77 3.25 9,227  0.32 0.67 44 64 
Poland -3.73 1.82 8.35 2.7 5.14 1.75 1.00 4,110  0.00 1.72 93 64 
Portugal -4.87 2.31 1.99 106.7 6.69 5.78 1.13 5,184  0.03 0.67 99 31 
Romania -5.69 0.19 5.71 0.8 4.49 6.68 2.87 4,136  0.00 0.83 90 42 
Russia -4.16 -2.69 6.32 6.3 3.27 4.64 1.46 4,815  0.00 5.72 95 36 
Singapore -5.85 0.24 2.93 36.1 8.72 6.45 0.04 8,843  0.38 3.47 8 48 
Slovenia -5.56 1.83 2.61 15.5 5.70 3.44 0.96 3,731  0.00 0.32 88 19 
South Africa -6.03 2.01 12.05 25.6 7.39 0.77 1.13 8,872  0.35 0.93 49 63 
South Korea -6.03 1.06 7.11 69.0 6.35 4.48 1.00 8,439  0.35 3.37 85 39 
Spain -3.82 1.60 2.67 123.0 6.57 4.18 0.35 5,310  0.10 3.46 86 42 
Sweden -3.28 2.18 4.94 105.9 8.58 3.64 0.05 4,708  0.03 2.28 29 5 
Switzerland -3.63 1.76 4.56 104.5 8.90 5.20 0.00 4,724  0.18 2.44 58 70 
Thailand -9.07 0.12 3.75 16.2 5.36 1.54 1.39 8,409  0.35 1.61 64 34 
Turkey -5.05 1.20 12.85 1.5 4.95 2.20 4.04 4,574  0.00 1.63 85 45 
Ukraine -5.02 1.92 n/a 3.5 2.93 0.52 5.07 4,202  0.00 0.83 n/a n/a 
United Kingdom -2.05 1.60 5.17 101.8 8.38 8.27 0.00 5,218  0.37 7.11 35 66 
United States -2.66 1.50 4.33 141.0 7.74 5.54 0.00 8,913  0.37 17.62 46 62 
Overall Average -5.07 1.54 5.52 62.8 6.74 4.70 1.32 6,686  0.16 2.9 64.5 50.3 
             
Panel B: Developed versus Emerging Markets    
  
FBIAS YLD (%) EXCH (%) BDEV 
(% GDP) 
PROP (0-
10) 
CAPOP    
(0-10) 
CRISK  DIST 
(km)  
COMLA 
(average) 
BILTR 
(%) 
UNTAV 
(1-100) 
MASC   
(1-100) 
Developed -3.93 1.75 4.16 95.9 7.92 6.13 0.33 6,321  0.18 4.2 59.1 50.0 
 
            
Emerging -6.37 1.24 7.57 16.0 5.31 2.97 2.45 7,104  0.14 1.3 71.5 50.7 
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Table III 
Regression Analysis of Foreign Bias 
The dependent variable is foreign bias (FBIAS), the log ratio of the share of a host country (country j) in bond holdings of a source country (country i) to the world bond market weight of country j. Two sets of regressors 
are included: i) Economic Fundamentals for host country j and ii) bilateral and investor-specific Familiarity Factors. Economic Fundamentals include annual yield on long-term government bonds (YLD) net of inflation 
and sovereign risk, log (natural) of exchange rate volatility (EXCH), log of bond market development (BDEV), protection of property rights (PROP), capital openness (CAPOP), and country risk (CRISK). Familiarity 
Factors include log of kilometer distance between countries (DIST), common language (COMLA) dummy, average bilateral trade weight assigned by partner countries (BILTR), uncertainty avoidance (UNTAV) of source 
country, and masculinity (MASC) of source country. INSB equals one minus home bias of source country i and controls for the obvious impact of country i’s domestic bias. All variables are constructed or sourced as 
reported in Table 1. All models report results with the standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity at panel level using White (1980) method. VARD shows relative importance of variables using variance decomposition 
analysis.  Data is for years 2001 to 2012. Statistical significance is reported against 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) significance levels. t-statistics are shown in parenthesis. 
 Expected  
Sign 
Model I 
 
Model II 
 
Model III 
 
Model IV 
 
VARD Standardized 
Coefficients 
YLD + 0.05***  0.05*** 0.06** 0.05% 0.038 
  (3.01)  (3.11) (2.31)   
        
EXCH - -0.81***  -0.81*** -0.51*** 2.70% -0.056 
  (-3.99)  (-9.78) (-4.68)   
        
BDEV + 0.31***  0.37*** 0.53*** 7.30% 0.109 
  (2.84)  (7.79) (3.01)   
        
PROP + 0.15**  0.25*** 0.09** 1.20% 0.023 
  (2.54)  (3.14) (2.06)   
        
CAPOP + 0.06**  0.11** 0.03** 0.03% 0.006 
  (2.51)  (2.54) (2.56)   
        
CRISK - -0.19***  -0.23*** -0.17*** 0.04% -0.029 
  (-2.98)  (-2.99) (-3.09)   
        
DIST -  -2.65*** -2.63*** -2.33*** 55.4% -0.369 
   (-24.35) (-23.33) (-20.79)   
        
COMLA  +  0.76*** 0.66** 0.82*** 1.50% 0.037 
   (2.82) (2.49) (3.88)   
        
BILTR +  0.05*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.06% 0.001 
   (5.37) (5.54) (3.39)   
        
UNTAV -  -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.05*** 28.20% -0.266 
   (-17.00) (-16.40) (-12.86)   
        
MASC +  0.04*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 2.30% 0.122 
   (8.92) (8.08) (3.46)   
        
INSB +    0.80***   
     (15.98)   
        
Year Fixed     YES   
Host Country Fixed YES YES YES YES   
        
Constant  -8.06*** -1.42** -7.08*** -0.88   
  (-8.28) (-2.26) (-7.38) (-0.85)   
Adjusted R 2 
Observations 
0.08 0.28 0.29 0.34   
14102 14102 14102 14102   
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Table IV 
Examining Reverse Causality 
The dependent variable is foreign bias (FBIAS), the log ratio of the share of a host country (country j) in bond holdings of a source country (country i) to the world bond market weight of country j. Two sets of regressors 
are included: i) Economic Fundamentals for host country j and ii) bilateral and investor-specific Familiarity Factors. Economic Fundamentals include annual yield on long-term government bonds (YLD) net of inflation 
and sovereign risk, log (natural) of exchange rate volatility (EXCH), log of bond market development (BDEV), protection of property rights (PROP), capital openness (CAPOP), and country risk (CRISK). Familiarity 
Factors include log of kilometer distance between countries (DIST), common language (COMLA) dummy, average bilateral trade weight assigned by partner countries (BILTR), uncertainty avoidance (UNTAV) of source 
country, and masculinity (MASC) of source country. INSB equals one minus home bias of source country i and controls for the obvious impact of country i’s domestic bias. All variables are constructed or sourced as 
reported in Table 1. All models report results with the standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity at panel level using White (1980) method. Data is for years 2001 to 2012. Statistical significance is reported against 
10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) significance levels. t-statistics are shown in parenthesis. 
 Expected Sign Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
YLD + 0.05**  0.05** 0.06*** 
  (2.30)  (2.41) (2.87) 
      
EXCH - -0.68***  -0.75*** -0.55*** 
  (-3.36)  (-4.04) (-3.98) 
      
BDEV (1-yr lag) + 0.27**  0.39** 0.45*** 
  (2.52)  (2.15) (3.13) 
      
PROP (1-yr lag) + 0.18***  0.17*** 0.09** 
  (3.07)  (3.44) (2.41) 
      
CAPOP (1-yr lag) + 0.05***  0.07** 0.04* 
  (2.91)  (2.19) (1.77) 
      
CRISK (1-yr lag) - -0.17**  -0.24*** -0.20*** 
  (-2.23)  (-3.23) (-2.91) 
      
DIST -  -2.51*** -2.51*** -1.92*** 
   (-22.25) (-21.26) (-19.31) 
      
COMLA  +  0.67** 0.55** 0.72*** 
   (2.52) (2.08) (3.25) 
      
BILTR (1-yr lag) +  0.08*** 0.08** 0.02*** 
   (5.07) (2.26) (3.37) 
      
UNTAV -  -0.07*** -0.06*** -0.05*** 
   (-16.89) (-16.12) (-13.24) 
      
MASC +  0.04*** 0.04*** 0.02*** 
   (9.37) (8.45) (3.97) 
      
INSB +    0.77*** 
     (14.20) 
      
Year Fixed     YES 
Host Country Fixed YES YES YES YES 
      
Constant  -7.10*** -1.27** -6.32*** -0.82 
  (-6.95) (-2.11) (-6.32) (-0.88) 
Adjusted R 2 
Observations 
0.08 0.29 0.30 0.35 
11715 11715 11715 11715 
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Table V 
Regression Analysis of Foreign Bias Excluding Financial Centres 
The dependent variable is foreign bias (FBIAS), the log ratio of the share of a host country (country j) in bond holdings of a source country (country i) to the world bond market weight of country j. Two sets of regressors 
are included: i) Economic Fundamentals for host country j and ii) bilateral and investor-specific Familiarity Factors. Economic Fundamentals include annual yield on long-term government bonds (YLD) net of inflation 
and sovereign risk, log (natural) of exchange rate volatility (EXCH), log of bond market development (BDEV), protection of property rights (PROP), capital openness (CAPOP), and country risk (CRISK). Familiarity 
Factors include log of kilometer distance between countries (DIST), common language (COMLA) dummy, average bilateral trade weight assigned by partner countries (BILTR), uncertainty avoidance (UNTAV) of source 
country, and masculinity (MASC) of source country. INSB equals one minus home bias of source country i and controls for the obvious impact of country i’s domestic bias. All variables are constructed or sourced as 
reported in Table 1. All models report results with the standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity at panel level using White (1980) method. Data is for years 2001 to 2012. Statistical significance is reported against 
10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) significance levels. t-statistics are shown in parenthesis.  
 Expected Sign Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
YLD + 0.05***  0.07*** 0.07*** 
  (2.87)  (2.89) (3.21) 
      
EXCH - -0.66***  -0.64*** -0.58*** 
  (-3.63)  (-9.50) (-2.79) 
      
BDEV + 0.31***  0.45*** 0.63*** 
  (3.05)  (3.21) (3.36) 
      
PROP + 0.17*  0.27*** 0.07** 
  (1.83)  (2.86) (2.06) 
      
CAPOP + 0.10**  0.13** 0.05** 
  (2.69)  (2.43) (2.31) 
      
CRISK - -0.24***  -0.25*** -0.18** 
  (-2.78)  (-2.71) (-2.58) 
      
DIST -  -3.00*** -3.00*** -2.23*** 
   (-24.53) (-23.48) (-19.59) 
      
COMLA  +  0.73** 0.61** 0.95*** 
   (2.31) (2.15) (3.56) 
      
BILTR +  0.07*** 0.08*** 0.03*** 
   (4.99) (3.14) (2.94) 
      
UNTAV -  -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.04*** 
   (-10.21) (-9.65) (-7.32) 
      
MASC +  0.03** 0.02** 0.02** 
   (2.53) (2.36) (2.26) 
      
INSB +    0.89*** 
     (6.33) 
      
Year Fixed     YES 
Host Country Fixed YES YES YES YES 
      
Constant  -9.09*** -1.09 -7.89*** -1.50 
  (-8.05) (-1.40) (-6.73) (-1.22) 
Adjusted R 2 
Observations 
0.10 0.28 0.29 0.33 
11539 11539 11539 11539 
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Table VI 
Examining Foreign Bias During Crises And Normal Times  
Foreign bias (FBIAS) is the log ratio of the share of a host country (country j) in bond holdings of a source country (country i) to the world bond market weight of country j. This table shows the 
comparative average foreign bias of country j during crisis and non-crisis periods using a t-test. Crisis periods include global financial crisis (2007-2008) and Eurozone sovereign debt crisis 
(2009-2011). 
  
Panel A: Foreign Bias – Normal Period versus Global Financial Crisis (2007-08) and Eurozone Debt Crisis (2009-11) 
 2001-06,  2012 2007-2011 Difference t-statistics p-value 
FBIAS -4.867 -5.289 0.422 4.610 0.000 
No. of Observations 20123     
 
Panel B: Foreign Bias – Normal Period versus Global Financial Crisis (2007-08) 
 2001-06,  2012 2007-08 Difference t- statistics p-value 
FBIAS -4.867 -4.716 -0.151 -1.211 0.226 
No. of Observations 13845     
 
Panel C: Foreign Bias – Normal Period versus Eurozone Debt Crisis (2009-11) 
 2001-06,  2012 2009-11 Difference t- statistics p-value 
FBIAS -4.867 -5.599 0.732 6.985 0.000 
No. of Observations 16735     
 
Panel D: Foreign Bias – Normal Period versus Eurozone Debt Crisis (2009-11) (GIIPS countries only) 
 2001-06,  2012 2009-11 Difference t- statistics p-value 
FBIAS -3.616 -4.428 0.813 2.933 0.003 
No. of Observations 2101     
  
41 
 
Table VII 
Bond Foreign Bias During Eurozone Debt Crisis and Global Financial Crisis 
The dependent variable is foreign bias (FBIAS), the log ratio of the share of a host country (country j) in bond holdings of a source country (country i) to the world bond market weight of country j. GIIPSCr is an interaction 
term of ECrisis and GIIPS. ECrisis is a dummy variable of 1 for Eurozone crisis years 2009 - 2011 and GIIPS is a dummy variable of 1 for five Eurozone crisis countries namely Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain 
(GIIPS), 0 otherwise. EuZCr is an interaction term of ECrisis and EZone. EZone is a dummy variable of 1 for all countries within the European Monetary Union, 0 otherwise. GCrisis is a dummy variable of 1 for Global 
Financial crisis years 2007 – 2008; 0 otherwise. Other regressors include: i) Economic Fundamentals for host country j and ii) bilateral and investor-specific Familiarity Factors. Economic Fundamentals include annual 
yield on long-term government bonds (YLD) net of inflation and sovereign risk, log (natural) of exchange rate volatility (EXCH), log of bond market development (BDEV), protection of property rights (PROP), capital 
openness (CAPOP), and country risk (CRISK). Familiarity Factors include log of kilometer distance between countries (DIST), common language (COMLA) dummy, average bilateral trade weight assigned by partner 
countries (BILTR), uncertainty avoidance (UNTAV) of source country, and masculinity (MASC) of source country. INSB equals one minus home bias of source country i and controls for the obvious impact of country i’s 
domestic bias. All variables are constructed or sourced as reported in Table 1. All models report results with the standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity at panel level using White (1980) method. Data is for years 
2001 to 2012. Statistical significance is reported against 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) significance levels. t-statistics are shown in parenthesis.   
 Model I 
All Countries 
Model II 
Interaction with EMU 
Model III  
Interaction with EMU except Germany and 
France 
Model IV 
Interaction with GIIPS 
ECrisis -0.47*** -0.55*** -0.47*** -0.46*** 
 (-3.97) (-3.95) (-3.61) (-3.76) 
GCrisis 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 
 (1.45) (1.45) (1.45) (1.45) 
EuZCr  -0.14 -0.12*  
  (-0.62) (-1.86)  
EZone  0.62*** 0.38  
  (2.74) (1.60)  
GIIPSCr    -0.24** 
    (-2.39) 
GIIPS    0.17 
    (0.61) 
YLD 0.03** 0.02* 0.02* 0.03*** 
 (2.52) (1.88) (1.84) (3.11) 
EXCH -1.31*** -1.26*** -1.26*** -1.31*** 
 (-5.87) (-5.75) (-5.69) (-5.95) 
BDEV 0.54*** 0.58*** 0.58*** 0.61*** 
 (4.25) (3.77) (3.76) (4.12) 
PROP 0.18** 0.19** 0.19** 0.06* 
 (2.39) (2.50) (2.50) (1.94) 
CAPOP 0.08** 0.08** 0.08** 0.11** 
 (2.37) (2.44) (2.42) (2.37) 
CRISK -0.28*** -0.29*** -0.29*** -0.28*** 
 (-3.58) (-3.64) (-3.66) (-3.60) 
DIST -2.32*** -2.32*** -2.32*** -2.32*** 
 (-20.74) (-20.74) (-20.45 (-20.74) 
COMLA  1.01*** 1.00*** 1.00*** 1.01*** 
 (3.89) (3.89) (3.77) (3.89) 
BILTR 0.02** 0.03** 0.03** 0.02** 
 (2.30) (2.31) (2.31) (2.32) 
UNTAV -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** 
 (-12.83) (-12.83) (-12.22) (-12.83) 
MASC 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 
 (3.45) (3.45) (3.46) (3.45) 
INSB 0.79*** 0.79*** 0.79*** 0.79*** 
 (15.89) (15.89) (15.25) (15.89) 
Host Country Fixed YES YES YES YES 
Constant -1.75* -1.60* -1.76* -1.79* 
 (-1.80) (-1.65) (-1.82) (-1.85) 
Adjusted R 2 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 
Observations 14102 14102 14102 14102 
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Table VIII 
Importance of Economic and Non-Economic Factors During Eurozone Debt Crisis  
The dependent variable is foreign bias (FBIAS), the log ratio of the share of a host country (country j) in bond holdings of a source country (country i) to the world bond market weight of country j. Two sets of regressors 
are included: i) Economic Fundamentals for host country j and ii) bilateral and investor-specific Familiarity Factors. Economic Fundamentals include annual yield on long-term government bonds (YLD) net of inflation and 
sovereign risk, log (natural) of exchange rate volatility (EXCH), log of bond market development (BDEV), protection of property rights (PROP), capital openness (CAPOP); country risk (CRISK) and are represented by 
FactorFund using factor analysis. Familiarity Factors include log of distance (in kilometers) between countries (DIST), common language (COMLA), average bilateral trade weight assigned by partner countries (BILTR), 
uncertainty avoidance (UNTAV) of source country, and masculinity (MASC) of source country; and are represented by FactorFam using factor analysis. INSB equals one minus domestic bias for source country i and controls 
for the obvious impact of country i’s domestic allocation as a share of total investment. CrFundW (CrFamW ) is an interaction term between FactorFund (FactorFam) and ECrisis. ECrisis is a dummy variable of 1 for 
years 2009-2011; otherwise 0. CrFundEu (CrFamEu) is an interaction term between FactorFund (FactorFam) and a dummy variable of 1 for all Eurozone countries during years 2009-2011, otherwise 0. CrFund5 (CrFam5) 
is an interaction term between FactorFund (FactorFam) and a dummy variable of 1 for five countries Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain (GIIPS) during years 2009-2011, otherwise 0. All models report results with 
the standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity at panel level using White (1980) method. Data is for years 2001 to 2012. Statistical significance is reported against 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) significance levels. t-
statistics are shown in parenthesis. 
 Model I 
Interaction with All 
Model II 
Interaction with Eurozone 
Model III 
Interaction with GIIPS 
FactorFund 0.83*** 0.79*** 0.76*** 
 (4.25) (4.07) (4.01) 
    
FactorFam -2.96*** -3.17*** -3.20*** 
 (-11.87) (-12.42) (-12.96) 
    
CrFundW 0.13   
 (1.19)   
    
CrFamW -1.06***   
 (-5.26)   
    
CrFundEu  -0.27  
  (-1.11)  
    
CrFamEu  -1.06**  
  (-2.56)  
    
CrFund5   -0.03 
   (-0.06) 
    
CrFam5   -2.67*** 
   (-2.83) 
    
INSB 1.04*** 1.04*** 1.05*** 
 (21.01) (20.97) (21.02) 
    
Host Country Fixed YES YES YES 
    
Constant 2.06*** 1.81** 1.76*** 
 (2.78) (2.47) (2.43) 
Adjusted R 2 0.28 0.28 0.28 
Observations 14102 14102 14102 
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Appendix 1 
Regression Analysis of Foreign Bias – FBIAS into Emerging and Developed Markets 
This table exhibits separate regression for foreign bias (FBIAS) into Emerging Markets (Column I) and Developed Markets (Column II). The dependent variable is FBIAS, the log ratio of the share of a host country 
(country j) in bond holdings of a source country (country i) to the world bond market weight of country j. Two sets of regressors are included: i) Economic Fundamentals for host country j and ii) bilateral and investor-
specific Familiarity Factors. Economic Fundamentals include annual yield on long-term government bonds (YLD) net of inflation and sovereign risk, log (natural) of exchange rate volatility (EXCH), log of bond market 
development (BDEV), protection of property rights (PROP), capital openness (CAPOP), and country risk (CRISK). Familiarity Factors include log of kilometer distance between countries (DIST), common language 
(COMLA) dummy, average bilateral trade weight assigned by partner countries (BILTR), uncertainty avoidance (UNTAV) of source country, and masculinity (MASC) of source country. INSB equals one minus home bias 
of source country i and controls for the obvious impact of country i’s domestic bias. All variables are constructed or sourced as reported in Table 1. All models report results with the standard errors corrected for 
heteroscedasticity at panel level using White (1980) method. VARD shows relative importance of variables using variance decomposition analysis.  Data is for years 2001 to 2012. Statistical significance is reported 
against 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) significance levels. t-statistics are shown in parenthesis 
                      I 
Into Emerging Markets 
VARD 
Emerging Markets 
Standardized Coefficients 
Emerging Markets  
II 
Into Developed Markets 
VARD 
Developed Markets 
Standardized Coefficients 
Developed Markets  
YLD 0.04** 0.12% 0.04 0.07** 5.73% 0.02 
 (2.03)   (2.35)   
       
EXCH -2.75*** 0.75% -0.21 -1.42*** 3.73% -0.12 
 (-7.75)   (-5.67)   
       
BDEV 0.36** 3.04% 0.07 0.33** 13.85% 0.05 
 (2.54)   (2.59)   
       
PROP 0.05* 0.18% 0.01 0.33*** 7.22% 0.06 
 (1.93)   (3.28)   
       
CAPOP 0.09* 0.2% 0.03 0.13*** 2.14% 0.05 
 (1.92)   (2.68)   
       
CRISK -0.10 0.24% -0.02 -0.42*** 8.39% -0.05 
 (-1.09)   (-3.67)   
       
DIST -3.32*** 59.44% -0.44 -2.04*** 37.63% -0.38 
 (-14.61)   (-16.40)   
       
COMLA  2.08*** 1.75% 0.11 0.60** 0.78% 0.04 
 (4.13)   (2.15)   
       
BILTR 0.06* -1.93% 0.03 0.04*** 0.21% 0.06 
 (1.81)   (2.67)   
       
UNTAV -0.06*** 30.77% -0.21 -0.04*** 17.87% -0.20 
 (-8.01)   (-9.77)   
       
MASC 0.02*** 4.71% 0.07 0.02** 0.45% 0.03 
 (2.65)   (2.67)   
       
INSB 1.29*** 1.5%% 0.34 0.61*** 1.3% 0.20 
 (14.34)   (10.70)   
Year Fixed YES   YES   
Host Country Fixed YES   YES   
Constant -4.84***   -3.45**   
 (-3.38)   (-2.17)   
Adjusted R 2 0.39   0.31   
Observations 4699   9403   
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Appendix 2 
Regression Analysis of Foreign Bias – Combinations of Emerging and Developed Markets 
This table exhibits results for separate regressions for foreign bias (FBIAS) originating from Emerging markets (EM) and Developed markets (DM). The dependent variable is FBIAS, the log ratio of the share of a host 
country (country j) in bond holdings of a source country (country i) to the world bond market weight of country j. Two sets of regressors are included: i) Economic Fundamentals for host country j and ii) bilateral and 
investor-specific Familiarity Factors. Economic Fundamentals include annual yield on long-term government bonds (YLD) net of inflation and sovereign risk, log (natural) of exchange rate volatility (EXCH), log of 
bond market development (BDEV), protection of property rights (PROP), capital openness (CAPOP), and country risk (CRISK). Familiarity Factors include log of kilometer distance between countries (DIST), common 
language (COMLA) dummy, average bilateral trade weight assigned by partner countries (BILTR), uncertainty avoidance (UNTAV) of source country, and masculinity (MASC) of source country. INSB equals one minus 
home bias of source country i and controls for the obvious impact of country i’s domestic bias. All variables are constructed or sourced as reported in Table 1. All models report results with the standard errors corrected 
for heteroscedasticity at panel level using White (1980) method. Data is for years 2001 to 2012. Statistical significance is reported against 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) significance levels. t-statistics are shown in 
parenthesis. 
 EM to All countries DM to All countries EM to DM DM to DM EM to EM DM to EM 
YLD 0.03** 0.02** 0.08** 0.01 0.07** 0.02** 
 (2.56) (2.42) (2.18) (1.46) (2.37) (2.25) 
       
EXCH -2.56*** -0.95*** -1.93*** -0.79*** -3.67*** -1.85*** 
 (-5.42) (-6.35) (-3.45) (-5.02) (-4.26) (-6.64) 
       
BDEV 0.20* 0.13* 0.62** 0.02* 0.58* 0.42** 
 (1.92) (1.98) (2.28) (1.95) (1.94) (2.06) 
       
PROP 0.37** 0.17*** 0.53** 0.18*** 0.04* 0.11* 
 (1.99) (2.86) (2.28) (3.36) (1.82) (1.96) 
       
CAPOP 0.13* 0.07*** 0.09* 0.05** 0.20* 0.05** 
 (1.71) (2.64) (1.81) (2.01) (1.88) (2.73) 
       
CRISK -0.27 -0.12** -0.28 -0.25*** -0.01 0.12 
 (-1.52) (-2.53) (-1.08) (-4.47) (-0.04) (1.27) 
       
DIST -2.92*** -1.50*** -2.74*** -1.05*** -2.83*** -2.96*** 
 (-14.80) (-15.04) (-12.17) (-11.69) (-5.74) (-12.82) 
       
COMLA  2.52*** 0.28* 1.83*** 0.09 3.91*** 0.98* 
 (5.45) (1.81) (3.51) (0.45) (4.02) (1.90) 
       
BILTR 0.01* 0.03* 0.03* 0.04* 0.12** 0.19** 
 (1.70) (1.81) (1.82) (1.75) (2.31) (2.23) 
       
UNTAV -0.06*** -0.03*** -0.05*** -0.02*** -0.06*** -0.05*** 
 (-6.57) (-8.03) (-5.57) (-5.38) (-3.07) (-6.61) 
       
MASC 0.05*** 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.02*** 0.07*** 0.04*** 
 (2.88) (7.03) (3.13) (3.74) (3.42) (5.93) 
       
INSB 0.02 0.19*** 0.15 0.02 0.36* 0.83*** 
 (0.18) (3.44) (1.20) (0.02) (1.65) (6.80) 
Year Fixed YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Host Country Fixed YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant -7.71*** -4.33*** -9.61*** -3.82*** -9.50*** -4.65*** 
 (-3.58) (-5.20) (-2.59) (-3.84) (-2.62) (-3.40) 
Adjusted R 2 0.31 0.33 0.29 0.36 0.30 0.35 
Observations 5291 8811 3682 5721 1609 3090 
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Appendix 3 - Bond Foreign Bias During Eurozone Debt Crisis and Global Financial Crisis – from non-EMU source countries 
This table shows regression results of foreign bias (FBIAS) from non-EMU source countries to all host countries. The dependent variable is FBIAS, the log ratio of the share of a host country (country j) in bond holdings of a source country (country 
i) to the world bond market weight of country j. GIIPSCr is an interaction term of ECrisis and GIIPS. ECrisis is a dummy variable of 1 for Eurozone crisis years 2009 - 2011 and GIIPS is a dummy variable of 1 for five Eurozone crisis countries 
namely Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain (GIIPS), 0 otherwise. EuZCr is an interaction term of ECrisis and EZone. EZone is a dummy variable of 1 for all countries within the European Monetary Union, 0 otherwise. GCrisis is a dummy 
variable of 1 for Global Financial crisis years 2007 – 2008; 0 otherwise. Other regressors include: i) Economic Fundamentals for host country j and ii) bilateral and investor-specific Familiarity Factors. Economic Fundamentals include annual yield 
on long-term government bonds (YLD) net of inflation and sovereign risk, log (natural) of exchange rate volatility (EXCH), log of bond market development (BDEV), protection of property rights (PROP), capital openness (CAPOP), and country risk 
(CRISK). Familiarity Factors include log of kilometer distance between countries (DIST), common language (COMLA) dummy, average bilateral trade weight assigned by partner countries (BILTR), uncertainty avoidance (UNTAV) of source country, 
and masculinity (MASC) of source country. INSB equals one minus home bias of source country i and controls for the obvious impact of country i’s domestic bias. All variables are constructed or sourced as reported in Table 1. All models report 
results with the standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity at panel level using White (1980) method. Data is for years 2001 to 2012. Statistical significance is reported against 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) significance levels. t-statistics are 
shown in parenthesis. 
 Model I 
All Countries 
Model II 
Interaction with EMU 
Model III 
Interaction with GIIPS 
ECrisis -0.75*** -0.64*** -0.64*** 
 (-4.71) (-3.33) (-3.84) 
GCrisis 0.28 0.27* 0.30 
 (1.59) (1.67) (1.62) 
EuZCr  -0.53*  
  (-1.82)  
EZone  0.76***  
  (3.52)  
GIIPSCr   -0.72* 
   (-1.80) 
GIIPS   -0.44* 
   (-1.70) 
YLD 0.05*** 0.04** 0.05*** 
 (2.83) (2.34) (2.92) 
EXCH -0.27* -0.18* -0.38** 
 (-1.73) (-1.79) (-2.34) 
BDEV 0.63*** 0.59*** 0.71*** 
 (8.43) (7.71) (8.96) 
PROP 0.12** 0.14** 0.11 
 (2.11) (2.47) (2.53) 
CAPOP 0.04* 0.03* 0.05* 
 (1.79) (1.84) (1.83) 
CRISK -0.22*** -0.23*** -0.19** 
 (-2.83) (-2.94) (-2.48) 
DIST -1.89*** -1.86*** -1.90*** 
 (-25.94) (-25.61) (-26.03) 
COMLA  1.36*** 1.49*** 1.36*** 
 (8.58) (9.16) (8.55) 
BILTR 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.03*** 
 (3.56) (3.79) (3.13) 
UNTAV -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.07*** 
 (-25.84) (-25.83) (-25.86) 
MASC 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 
 (7.19) (7.10) (7.18) 
INSB 0.59*** 0.59*** 0.59*** 
 (15.98) (16.07) (16.00) 
Constant -4.15*** -3.46*** -4.24*** 
 (-7.59) (-5.56) (-7.76) 
Adjusted R 2 0.33 0.33 0.33 
Observations 9749 9749 9749 
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Appendix 4 - Bond Foreign Bias During Eurozone Debt Crisis and Global Financial Crisis – from EMU source countries 
This table shows regression results of foreign bias (FBIAS) from EMU source countries to all host countries. The dependent variable is FBIAS, the log ratio of the share of a host country (country j) in bond holdings of a source country (country i) to 
the world bond market weight of country j. GIIPSCr is an interaction term of ECrisis and GIIPS. ECrisis is a dummy variable of 1 for Eurozone crisis years 2009 - 2011 and GIIPS is a dummy variable of 1 for five Eurozone crisis countries namely 
Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain (GIIPS), 0 otherwise. EuZCr is an interaction term of ECrisis and EZone. EZone is a dummy variable of 1 for all countries within the European Monetary Union, 0 otherwise. GCrisis is a dummy variable of 
1 for Global Financial crisis years 2007 – 2008; 0 otherwise. Other regressors include: i) Economic Fundamentals for host country j and ii) bilateral and investor-specific Familiarity Factors. Economic Fundamentals include annual yield on long-term 
government bonds (YLD) net of inflation and sovereign risk, log (natural) of exchange rate volatility (EXCH), log of bond market development (BDEV), protection of property rights (PROP), capital openness (CAPOP), and country risk (CRISK). 
Familiarity Factors include log of kilometer distance between countries (DIST), common language (COMLA) dummy, average bilateral trade weight assigned by partner countries (BILTR), uncertainty avoidance (UNTAV) of source country, and 
masculinity (MASC) of source country. INSB equals one minus home bias of source country i and controls for the obvious impact of country i’s domestic bias. All variables are constructed or sourced as reported in Table 1. All models report results 
with the standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity at panel level using White (1980) method. Data is for years 2001 to 2012. Statistical significance is reported against 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) significance levels. t-statistics are shown in 
parenthesis. 
 Model I 
All Countries 
Model II 
Interaction with EMU 
Model III 
Interaction with GIIPS 
ECrisis -0.73*** -1.11*** -0.75*** 
 (-4.15) (-4.77) (-3.90) 
GCrisis 0.02 -0.01 -0.03 
 (0.10) (-0.06) (-0.19) 
EuZCr  0.45*  
  (1.75)  
EZone  1.90***  
  (9.85)  
GIIPSCr   -0.13* 
   (-1.71) 
GIIPS   1.65*** 
   (8.99) 
YLD1 0.04** 0.03* 0.04* 
 (2.01) (1.88) (1.86) 
EXCH -0.60*** -0.41** -0.31** 
 (-3.49) (-2.40) (-2.22) 
BDEV 0.57*** 0.47*** 0.40*** 
 (6.81) (5.54) (4.53) 
PROP 0.10* 0.08* 0.07* 
 (1.78) (1.91) (1.74) 
CAPOP 0.02* 0.01* 0.03* 
 (1.87) (1.71) (1.88) 
CRISK -0.11* -0.15** -0.12* 
 (-1.77) (-2.03) (-1.91) 
DIST -1.69*** -1.47*** -1.61*** 
 (-21.63) (-19.90) (-21.07) 
COMLA  0.98*** 0.55*** 0.71*** 
 (4.82) (2.88) (3.68) 
BILTR 0.00 0.03*** 0.01 
 (0.48) (3.33) (0.68) 
UNTAV -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** 
 (-14.46) (-14.67) (-14.48) 
MASC 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 
 (5.81) (5.85) (5.86) 
INSB 0.31*** 0.32*** 0.32*** 
 (5.86) (6.10) (6.05) 
Host Country Fixed YES YES YES 
Constant -1.89*** 0.66 -1.79*** 
 (-3.28) (0.98) (-3.08) 
Adjusted R 2 0.44 0.44 0.44 
Observations 4353 4353 4353 
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Appendix 5- Bond Foreign Bias During Eurozone Debt Crisis and Global Financial Crisis – All countries to non-EMU 
This table shows regression results of foreign bias (FBIAS) from all source countries to non-EMU host countries. The dependent variable is FBIAS, the log ratio of the share of a host country (country j) in bond holdings 
of a source country (country i) to the world bond market weight of country j. ECrisis is a dummy variable of 1 for Eurozone crisis years 2009 – 2011.  GCrisis is a dummy variable of 1 for Global Financial crisis years 
2007 – 2008; 0 otherwise. Other regressors include: i) Economic Fundamentals for host country j and ii) bilateral and investor-specific Familiarity Factors. Economic Fundamentals include annual yield on long-term 
government bonds (YLD) net of inflation and sovereign risk, log (natural) of exchange rate volatility (EXCH), log of bond market development (BDEV), protection of property rights (PROP), capital openness (CAPOP), 
and country risk (CRISK). Familiarity Factors include log of kilometer distance between countries (DIST), common language (COMLA) dummy, average bilateral trade weight assigned by partner countries (BILTR), 
uncertainty avoidance (UNTAV) of source country, and masculinity (MASC) of source country. INSB equals one minus home bias of source country i and controls for the obvious impact of country i’s domestic bias. All 
variables are constructed or sourced as reported in Table 1. All models report results with the standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity at panel level using White (1980) method. Data is for years 2001 to 2012. 
Statistical significance is reported against 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) significance levels. t-statistics are shown in parenthesis. 
 Model I 
Non-EMU host countries 
ECrisis -0.81*** 
 (-5.09) 
GCrisis 0.14 
 (0.88) 
YLD 0.04** 
 (2.57) 
EXCH -0.42** 
 (-2.11) 
BDEV 0.62*** 
 (9.02) 
PROP 0.06** 
 (2.09) 
CAPOP 0.02* 
 (1.87) 
CRISK -0.11** 
 (-2.33) 
DIST -1.98*** 
 (-29.60) 
COMLA  1.00*** 
 (6.06) 
BILTR 0.02** 
 (2.36) 
UNTAV -0.06*** 
 (-21.06) 
MASC 0.02*** 
 (6.32) 
INSB 0.96*** 
 (24.44) 
Host Country Fixed YES 
Constant -0.61 
 (-1.07) 
Adjusted R 2 0.33 
Observations 9521 
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Appendix 6 - Bond Foreign Bias During Eurozone Debt Crisis and Global Financial Crisis – All countries to EMU 
This table shows regression results of foreign bias (FBIAS) from all source countries to EMU host countries. The dependent variable is FBIAS, the log ratio of the share of a host country (country j) in bond holdings of 
a source country (country i) to the world bond market weight of country j. GIIPSCr is an interaction term of ECrisis and GIIPS. ECrisis is a dummy variable of 1 for Eurozone crisis years 2009 - 2011 and GIIPS is a 
dummy variable of 1 for five Eurozone crisis countries namely Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain (GIIPS), 0 otherwise. GCrisis is a dummy variable of 1 for Global Financial crisis years 2007 – 2008; 0 otherwise. 
Other regressors include: i) Economic Fundamentals for host country j and ii) bilateral and investor-specific Familiarity Factors. Economic Fundamentals include annual yield on long-term government bonds (YLD) net 
of inflation and sovereign risk, log (natural) of exchange rate volatility (EXCH), log of bond market development (BDEV), protection of property rights (PROP), capital openness (CAPOP), and country risk (CRISK). 
Familiarity Factors include log of kilometer distance between countries (DIST), common language (COMLA) dummy, average bilateral trade weight assigned by partner countries (BILTR), uncertainty avoidance (UNTAV) 
of source country, and masculinity (MASC) of source country. INSB equals one minus home bias of source country i and controls for the obvious impact of country i’s domestic bias. All variables are constructed or 
sourced as reported in Table 1. All models report results with the standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity at panel level using White (1980) method. Data is for years 2001 to 2012. Statistical significance is 
reported against 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) significance levels. t-statistics are shown in parenthesis. 
 Model I 
EMU Countries 
Model II 
Interaction with GIIPS 
ECrisis -1.20*** -1.10*** 
 (-5.80) (-4.16) 
GCrisis 0.18 0.25 
 (0.87) (1.23) 
GIIPSCr  -0.36* 
  (-1.95) 
GIIPS  0.44 
  (1.36) 
YLD 0.03 0.03 
 (1.39) (1.53) 
EXCH -0.18 -0.10 
 (-0.51) (-0.28) 
BDEV 0.90*** 0.86*** 
 (6.61) (6.04) 
PROP 0.35*** 0.45*** 
 (4.43) (3.91) 
CAPOP 0.10** 0.10** 
 (2.46) (2.50) 
CRISK -0.70*** -0.71*** 
 (-5.65) (-5.71) 
DIST -2.27*** -2.27*** 
 (-26.11) (-26.22) 
COMLA  0.30 0.36 
 (1.22) (1.43) 
BILTR 0.04*** 0.03*** 
 (3.40) (2.95) 
UNTAV -0.03*** -0.03*** 
 (-8.71) (-8.81) 
MASC 0.02** 0.02** 
 (2.19) (2.25) 
INSB 0.48*** 0.48*** 
 (10.01) (9.91) 
Host Country Fixed YES YES 
Constant -6.03*** -7.17*** 
 (-3.85) (-4.05) 
Adjusted R 2 0.32 0.32 
Observations 4581 4581 
 
